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We constantly face the challenge of selecting among actions in pursuit
of our goals. Behavioral theories suggest the ubiquity of these choices neces-
sitate a valuation process that integrates expected costs and outcomes. In-
creased sensitivity to costs in value-based choices, such as reduced willingness
to tolerate risk, wait or work for rewards, features prominently in the symp-
tomatology of mental illness. Contrary to classical theories of choice that do
not distinguish among cost type, the recent unification of experimental eco-
nomics, psychology and neuroscience describes the influence of specific costs
upon behavioral and neural correlates of subjective value. Despite substan-
tial progress in the understanding of the basis of subjective valuation under
delay and risk, the specific influence of effort, the energetic cost of an action,
remains largely unknown. Limited existing accounts hypothesize that cost
sensitivity during subjective valuation results from separable neural systems
related to risk, delay and effort. This dissertation evaluates evidence for dis-
tinct neural representation of effort and presents a set of experiments designed
vi
to refine normative accounts of effort-based choice. First, I review the neural
basis of economic choice under risk and delay. Second, I review limited ac-
counts economic choice under effort. I describe a novel prospective effort task
designed and validated to examine effort-based valuation and address poten-
tial confounds present in previous studies. In the first experiment, I report
novel evidence for discounting of neural activity related to value by prospective
effort and conjoint sensitivity to effort costs and expected outcomes in brain
regions related to selection and generation of actions. In a second experiment, I
examined the influence of prospective effort costs upon delay discounting pref-
erences. This experiment did not find modulation of individual preferences by
prospective effort costs. Finally, I discuss our results in the context of existing
accounts and potential extensions of the prospective effort paradigm. Overall,
I show that prospective effort imposes a specific cost, reflected in behavioral
and neural correlates of value, and presents a novel approach to further the
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We often face choices between uncertain prospects associated with en-
ergetic costs. For example, consider the choice between two equally rated,
unfamiliar restaurants at different distances. The value of a trip to neither
restaurant is certain, but they differ substantially in potential energetic cost.
Adaptive behavior requires integration of these costs and benefits to guide
choice. An extensive body of work in economics and neuroscience describes
the interaction of costs and benefits upon behavioral and neural correlates of
subjective value. However, the specific influence and representation of effort,
the energetic cost of a decision option, remains clouded by confounds and a
lack of consensus. In this thesis, I describe a set of model-driven behavioral and
neuroimaging experiments designed to characterize the neural representation
of effort and its role in economic choice behavior.
General deficits in decision making, particularly reduced motivation
to work for reward, feature prominently in the symptomatology of psychiatric
disorders such as depression and schizophrenia. Characterizing the neural rep-
resentation of effort and its influence upon choice behavior will provide crucial
1
new evidence for models of normal brain function that inform the treatment of
these disorders. The behavioral and neuroimaging experiments that comprise
this thesis attempted to elucidate the specific influence of effort in modula-
tion of valuation processes in choice with incentive compatible decision mak-
ing tasks adapted from previously described domains, risk and intertemporal
choice.
Behavioral experiments provide the basis for two sets of neuroimaging
analyses that characterize the representation of effort and valuation in the
brain. A set of univariate analyses extend previous analyses applied to eco-
nomic choice tasks and examine the relationship between behavioral and neural
correlates of sensitivity to effort costs. A second set of multivariate analyses
test for similar patterns of neural activity related to effort during production
and choice. In total, the experiments described herein represent the first sys-
tematic attempt separate valuation from effort production and reward receipt,
a critical advance to test the representation effort-based valuation and advance
normative accounts of cost-based choice.
1.2 Literature Review: The Neural Basis of Valuation
1.2.1 Abstract
Economic decision making refers to decisions that involve mainly mon-
etary rewards between courses of action with different potential outcomes.
The emergence of neuroeconomics, the integration of decision making perspec-
tives from behavioral economics, psychology, and the neurosciences, provides
2
a framework to link normative accounts of decision making to brain activity
and behavior. To illustrate the advance of this approach, we focus on two
types of economic decision making addressed by brain imaging and neuroe-
conomic research: decision making under risk and intertemporal choice. We
present an overview of risk and economic decision making, relevant behavioral
paradigms from economic and psychological research and neuroimaging results
that link neural activity to specific patterns of decision making. The following
text adapts a forthcoming chapter entitled Neuroimaging of Economic Deci-
sion Making in Brain Mapping: An Encyclopedic Reference, by the author and
Tom Schonberg.
1.2.2 Economic decision making and Neural Correlates of Value
How the brain makes choices constitutes the primary focus of neuroe-
conomics, a nascent discipline that combines economic theory, choice behavior
and biological measurements from the neurosciences. Much of the growth
of this research followed the rise of functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) in cognitive neuroscience. Functional MRI enables researchers to non-
invasively observe neural activity in humans during economic decision making
tasks. Foremost, these studies have established that neural activity related
to the value of a chosen action occurs in several brain areas during stages of
economic decision making (Rangel et al., 2008). Neural signals related to value
include individual stimulus values, action/outcome values and prediction er-
rors. However, whether these signals reflect unitary representations of value
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or components of other cognitive processes remains controversial (O’Doherty,
2014). Overall, neuroimaging studies complement other neural data to in-
form descriptive models of choice. As discussed in this chapter, this reductive
approach has begun to influence our understanding of choice behavior.
1.2.3 Economic Decision Making Under Risk
Economic decisions are generally understood to occur under risk. As
discussed by Schonberg et al. (2011) there exists a gap between the psycho-
logical and economic definition of risky decision making. Economists refer
to risk as the variance of all possible outcomes (Markowitz, 1952). Accord-
ing to this definition, a risk-seeking person favors a higher variance prospect
over a lower one when expected value is equal between the two options. On
the other hand, psychologists as well as lay people generally refer to a risky
decision as one that involves potentially incurring a loss or harm (Steinberg,
2008). These separate definitions have led to the use of separate tasks in neu-
roimaging studies of risky decision making. Early tasks defined risk-taking
as variance of potential outcomes. These studies typically contrasted safe op-
tions with sure wins versus risky ones where the probabilities of outcomes were
known. Several brain regions implicated in reward processing and value-based
decision making have emerged in imaging studies involving these tasks. Re-
gions involved in processing of risky versus safe options include the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), insula and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC)
(Critchley et al., 2001; Paulus et al., 2003; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005). One
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notable effort to separate reward from processing the quadratic nature of risk
as variance of outcomes by Preuschoff et al. (2008) found risk-related sig-
nals in anterior insula and ventral striatum. The authors used a model-based
approach to segregate changes in expected value and prediction error from en-
coding of the variance of potential outcomes The regions implicated in these
paradigms, striatum and insula, are linked to processing of reward and aversive
emotion (Tom et al., 2007; Palminteri et al., 2012), a necessary component of
risky decisions. Related studies associated increased individual tendency for
risk-seeking with neural activity within frontal regions implicated in reward
and value processing, including orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (Tobler et al., 2006; Xue et al., 2009). Risk-averse
behavior has been linked to increased activity in more dorsal frontal cortical
areas (dlPFC, inferior frontal gyrus), regions that were previously linked to
exertion of self-control (Dosenbach et al., 2006). For example, Hare et al.
(2009) demonstrated that exertion of self-control in a food choice paradigm
involves the modulation of value signals in vmPFC by signals within dlPFC.
The contribution of attention and self-control to risk-taking behavior remains
an active area of neuroimaging research.
1.2.4 Naturalistic Risk Taking Tasks
While many studies have begun to link economic measures of risk-
taking behavior to neural activity, a gap remains between laboratory tasks
and risky decision making in the real world (Schonberg et al., 2011). Thus,
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there exists a need for a set of tasks to link naturalistic measures and the
typical behavioral tasks of economics and psychology laboratories. One such
example (others are reviewed in Schonberg et al. (2011)) that has been exten-
sively used for assessment of risk-taking in recent years is the Balloon Analog
Risk Task (BART) (Lejuez et al., 2002). In this task, participants sequentially
decide to pump or not pump a balloon that represents accumulated wealth.
The size of the balloon on the screen increases with each pump. Critically, by
deciding not to pump the balloon, participants ’cash-out’ the wealth accumu-
lated up to that trial. Participants know that while additional pumps increase
the potential gain, they could lose all potentially accumulated wealth for that
trial if too many pumps are made. Increased risk-taking (measured as average
number of pumps taken in the BART) has been linked to drug use, smoking,
unprotected sex and more (See Helfinstein et al. (2014) for a list of relevant
studies). Neuroimaging studies of the BART, e.g. (Rao et al., 2008; Schonberg
et al., 2012) found that neural activity during risk-taking occurs in dlPFC and
vmPFC, the same regions found by studies that used the economic definition
of risk discussed above. See figure 1.1 for details. However, these regions can-
not be solely attributed to risk-taking. In the BART, each pump (additional
risk-taking) conflates several factors: increasing potential gains, increasing
potential losses, and increasing probability of loss and variance of potential
outcomes. Consequently, although this task predicts real-world risk-taking,
neuroimaging studies with the task have shown activations related to all of
these factors, rather than isolated activity related to risky decision making.
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Helfinstein et al. (2014) addressed this confound of earlier BART studies with
a multivariate voxel-pattern classification technique. This approach attempted
to equate all BART factors by testing the ability of a classifier trained upon
neural activity from trials prior to the decision to pump or cash-out to pre-
dict what the participants will do on the subsequent trial. The authors found
that activity within a network of brain regions related to cognitive control best
predicts participants subsequent behavior in the BART. This cognitive control
network, rather than regions related to increased potential reward, seems to
determine if participants will take more risk in a subsequent trial. This result
suggests that increased risk-seeking behavior in the real world may relate more
closely to a lack of ability to adaptively inhibit responses, rather than seeking
greater overall value or large individual rewards.
Figure 1.1: fMRI activations related to parametric analysis of increased risk taking
in the ballon analog risk task (BART). Warm colors indicate regions where neu-
ral activity positively correlated with increased risk taking behavior (ACC, insula
and lateral PFC). Cool colors indicate regions that were negatively correlated with
increased risk taking behavior (vmPFC and MTL). Together, these regions were
sensitive to potential gains, losses and probability in the task. Figure adapted with
permission from Schonberg et al., (2012)
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1.2.5 Prospect Theory and the Brain
Motivated by the failure of the prescriptions of classical economics to ac-
count for commonly observed biases in choice, Kahneman and Tversky (1979);
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) developed prospect theory, the most success-
ful normative account of choice behavior, to describe behavior under risk. For
example, common behaviors such as avoidance of small risks framed as losses
and reluctance to gamble with profits deviate from classical economics ratio-
nal prescriptions to maximize gains. For example, snack foods labeled 99% fat
free or 1% fat offer the same dietary value, but consumers’ greater sensitivity
to negative information (fat content) encourages advertisers use of a positive
frame. Overall, prospect theory provides context for these realistic deviations
from optimality with a mathematical and conceptual framework for choices
under risk. Briefly, prospect theory describes choices as made from the status
quo, a reference point for comparison of potential gains and losses. A value
function describes the utility of gains and losses relative to the status quo
(See figure 1.2). This function exhibits asymmetries that reflect loss aversion,
greater decreases in value for losses compared to increases in value for equiv-
alent gains. Additionally, prospect theory describes asymmetric sensitivity to
probabilities of outcomes, characterized by a typical decision-makers tendency












Figure 1.2: Prospect theory describes choice behavior under risk according to non-
linear value and probability weighting functions. (A) A typical value function (v),
describes the value of gains and losses relative to a decision makers reference point.
The change in slope from gains to losses reflects greater change in relative value for
losses over gains. (B) Nonlinear decision weight (w) function of objective probabili-
ties (p). Curvature reflects underweighting of high probabilities and overweighting
of high probabilities. Figure adapted with permission from (Schonberg et al., 2011)
Overall, the distortions of probability and changes in value described
by prospect theory suggest that economic choices reflect these biases and other
rules employed to simplify them, rather than representation of a vast set of
complex outcome expectations. Accordingly, neuroimaging provides an op-
portunity to examine the relationship between behavior under risk and brain
activity related to value to test the predictions of prospect theory. Tom et al.
(2007) examined neural activity with fMRI while participants completed a
task to assess loss aversion behavior, the mixed gambles paradigm. During
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this task, subjects chose to accept or reject lottery tickets that offered an equal
chance at winning or losing varied amounts of money. The authors found that
within vmPFC and striatum, patterns of neural activity followed the asym-
metric pattern of greater sensitivity to potential losses over gains predicted
by prospect theory. Additionally, individual differences in subjects sensitivity
to losses as compared to gains also reflected individual differences in neural





Figure 1.3: The neural basis of loss aversion: (a) Illustration of the event-related
mixed-gambles task design. During each trial, participants accepted or rejected
prospective mixed-gambles (equal probability of gain or loss). (b) Heatmap of prob-
ability of gamble acceptance at collapsed levels of gain and loss. Warmer color
indicates greater willingness to accept a gamble. (c) Whole-brain parametric re-
sponses to the size of potential loss (cool colors, left) or gain (warm colors, right).
Gain sensitive regions include vmPFC, striatum, cingulate cortex and dopaminergic
midbrain regions. Loss sensitive regions also included vmPFC, cingulate cortex and
striatum. A conjunction analyses demonstrated joint sensitivity to gains and losses
in vmPFC and striatum. (d) Map of striatum region (red pixels) with joint sensi-
tivity to gain and loss, and heatmap (e) of cluster within green circle (d). Heatmaps
average parameter estimates versus baseline within cluster for each of 16 cells of
gain/loss matrix. Color-coding indicates strength of neural response for each con-
dition, illustrating greatest activation (warm color) and deactivation (cool color).
These results show asymmetric activation for gains and losses within the same valu-
ation region, related to choice behavior described by prospect theory in (b). Figure
adapted with permission from Tom et al., (2007).
11
Controversially, neural activity within regions previously implicated in
the experience of pain or loss, such as the insular cortex and amygdala, did
not exhibit a pattern related to loss aversion. However, subsequent studies
demonstrated involvement of these regions in closely related tasks (De Martino
et al., 2010; Canessa et al., 2013). These results support a proposal that
neural activity patterns related to loss aversion result from the modulation of
vmPFC and striatal activity by affective processing regions such as amygdala
and insular cortex, , rather than single valuation process within them. The
precise causal role of regions outside of the core valuation network remains
an active area of research. To examine neural activity related to the framing
effect, De Martino et al. (2010) presented subjects with a choice between sure
outcomes and gambles, each equivalent in expected value, in either gain or loss
frames. Acceptance of a sure gain in the gain frame or risky loss in a loss frame
evoked amygdala activity, consistent with the proposal that framing effects
result from hedonic processes related to aversion. Activity in regions related to
cognitive control, such as anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex increased when the opposite choices occurred. As demonstrated with
loss aversion (Tom et al., 2007) and nonlinear probability weighting (Hsu et al.,
2009) the authors found that neural activity in striatum related to individual
changes in choice. Together, these studies have begun to identify the neural
correlates of prospect theory, the interaction of a core valuation network with
networks of regions related to emotional drives and cognitive control. The
causal role of activity within the core valuation regions and those linked to
12
affective distortions of value remains a major focus of neuroeconomics.
1.2.6 Intertemporal Choice
Economic decision makers often face intertemporal choices, decisions
that differ in the timing of their outcomes. From an individual choice between
renting or buying, to a governments’ investment in environmental protection,
these choices require consideration of what an outcome is worth to the decision-
maker in the future. Therefore, the ability to evaluate the future consequences
of a choice necessarily requires the integration of what an outcome is worth
and its associated delay. Studies of intertemporal choice focus upon the robust
finding that humans and animals exhibit delay-discounting behavior, choice
preferences that suggest equivalent rewards become less valuable in the future
as compared to the present (Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995; Kim et al., 2008).
Behavioral models of choice describe the value of a reward outcome available
later in time according to a discount function, the form of which characterizes
how the value decreases over time. To estimate this function, studies typically
present subjects with a series of choices between small rewards available imme-
diately and larger rewards of varying size available at one of several later times.
Notably, choices in human and animal studies may differ in important ways.
Early human studies often presented hypothetical choices, while animal studies
necessarily presented actual delays to consumable rewards after each choice.
In an attempt to address the ecological validity necessary to compare findings
across species, more recent human studies select a single trial at random from
13
the experimental session, and honor the subjects choice accordingly. In either
case, a discount function estimated from intertemporal choices, compared to
the fit of a decay function, characterizes the rate at which an individual animal
or human subject devalues rewards over time.
The preferred form of the discount function employed in studies of in-
tertemporal choice reflects the evolution of the study of these choices and
remains a source of debate. Theoretical work on intertemporal choice in eco-
nomics historically focused on prescriptions of how decision makers should
discount the value of delayed rewards. The exponential discount model, based
on the work of Samuelson (1937), presented the first widely accepted account
of discounting over time. Despite the simplicity and success of this model,
advanced over several decades, converging evidence now suggests humans and
animal behaviors do not truly reflect the assumptions of exponential discount-
ing. For example, Mazur’s (1987) study of intertemporal choice in pigeons
concluded that their behavior fit more closely to a hyperbolic discount func-
tion. This characterization allows the weight of discounting to vary over time,
rather than the fixed decay of exponential discounting. Hyperbolic or quasi-
hyperbolic discount rates provide a superior fit to human and animal behavior
over exponential decay models in studies of delayed reward and punishment
alike, in monetary and non-monetary domains. Consequently, neuroimaging
studies of intertemporal choice now focus on these discount forms. An im-
portant debate within the study of intertemporal choice centers upon how
hyperbolic preferences might arise. Broadly, theoretical accounts in psychol-
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ogy and economics emphasize a competition between rationally deliberate and
irrationally emotional processes (Ainslie, 1975; Loewenstein, 1996). These
views comprise a dual-process account that links the observation of hyper-
bolic discounting to the competition of a system that strongly favors imme-
diate rewards with a second that more rationally values rewards across time
(Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2004). Similar normative accounts of competi-
tion between ’hot’ and ’cold’ systems during choice follow this model, whereby
failure to suppress the ’hot’ system results in suboptimal bias for immedi-
ate rewards (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). Formally, dual process models fit
quasi-hyperbolic or beta-delta discount functions to choice behavior, whereby
two parameters reflect the separate influence of patient and impulsive systems
(Laibson, 1997). Alternatively, single-process models posit a unitary discount
process akin to a general hyperbolic function fit by a single parameter (Kirby,
1997). See Figure 1.4 for examples of typical temporal discount functions.
Given the relevance of understanding the neural mechanisms of intertemporal
choice to major public health issues, many neuroeconomic studies attempt to
link behavioral preferences to specific neural correlates. As in studies of choice
under risk, these studies also provide evidence for a core network of brain
regions for valuation.
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Comparison of Common Discount Functions
Figure 1.4: Examples of typical temporal discount functions: Exponential discount-
ing assumes a constant rate of discounting, e.g. δ (t) where δ is the discount rate
(here, δ =0.96). Hyperbolic discounting is generally greater for short time periods
than long periods, and can be described by a function of the form 1/(k * t + 1),
(here, k = 0.11). Quasi-hyperbolic discounting is a piecewise function that follows a
form similar to exponential discounting after the first discount period (i.e. the first
day): (Here, β = 0.8 and δ = 0.96.) Figure adapted with permission from (Berns
et al., 2007).
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1.2.7 Functional Neuroimaging Evidence for Temporally Discounted
Value
The recent work of two groups summarizes attempts to resolve the
neural mechanisms that contribute to intertemporal choice behavior. A series
of studies by McClure et al. (2004, 2007) support a dual-process model of
discounting. In their first study, subjects made a series of choices between
pairs of hypothetical rewards. Their analyses split trials into two types. In
the first type, both rewards were available at some point in the future. The
second type always offered an immediate, smaller reward. Comparison of
these trials found one set of brain regions (vmPFC, cingulate cortex, striatum)
more active during choices with immediate rewards than delayed rewards only.
Activity in lateral prefrontal and intraparietal regions increased compared to
baseline during rest and increased reaction time. By comparing the activity
of these two systems during trials with an immediate reward, the authors
successfully predicted choice behavior. They argued these results reflect the
competition of brain regions that comprise the patient and impatient systems
predicted by dual-process theory. In their interpretation, neural activity in the
medial prefrontal cortex and striatum constitute the impatient beta system,
while the limbic and lateral prefrontal cortex constitute the more patient delta
system. A replication of this study with primary rewards (juice available
to thirsty subjects) and shorter delays (up to twenty minutes) supported the
initial finding, and again enabled prediction of choice by comparison of activity
in these two defined networks of brain regions (McClure et al., 2007).
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While these results support the conception of delay discounting as a
competition between structures related to evolutionarily older, irrational drives
and more evolved, rational deliberation, two subsequent studies by a second
group of authors, Kable and Glimcher (2007, 2010), argued for an alterna-
tive, single-process interpretation. Unlike the previous studies, the authors
estimated the value of the discount rate for each subject, following Mazur’s
(1987) single-parameter hyperbolic formula. Subjects’ discount parameters
allowed them to compare fMRI activity to predicted value, which elicited a
network of regions related to the subjective value of delayed reward options.
They found that while some of these regions overlap with the beta system of
the dual-process model (vmPFC, posterior cingulate cortex, striatum) neu-
ral activity within these regions did not exclusively increase to immediate
reward. Importantly, these results suggest that activity in these regions dur-
ing choice evaluation reflects a unified representation of discounted subjective
value within a core valuation network, rather than fully separable discounting
processes. Kable and Glimcher’s second study compared the two trial types
of McClure and colleagues original study (Kable and Glimcher, 2010). Again,
choices that presented two delayed options were compared to choices with one
immediate reward and one delayed reward. Neural activity in McClure et
al.’s beta system regions again reflected estimated subjective value, regardless
which reward type was more valuable. More recent studies provide additional
evidence for neural activity related to components of valuation within core
valuation regions during intertemporal choices. For example, two studies link
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activity within striatum at choice to magnitude of delayed rewards (Pine et al.,
2009) and differences in discounting behavior (Hariri et al., 2006). Figure 1.5
summarizes brain regions related to aspects of intertemporal choice. Like
economic decisions under risk, further understanding of the neural basis of in-
tertemporal choice will require investigation of how regions that demonstrate
discounted value representations reported thus far interact with brain networks
related to other processes, particularly emotion, self-control and memory.
Figure 1.5: Several brain networks have been implicated in economic decision mak-
ing in the realms of intertemporal choice and risky decisions: the valuation network
includes the vmPFC, striatum and dopaminergic midbrain areas. The cognitive
control network, involved in modulation of risk-taking behavior, includes lateral
frontal regions and cingulate cortex. Figure adapted with permission from (Peters
and Büchel, 2011).
1.3 Discussion
Neuroimaging research has contributed important evidence in support
of neuroeconomics’ goal of a unified economic decision making model. This
chapter reviewed the key contribution of neuroimaging to this endeavor, iden-
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tification of neural correlates of predictions of valuation from economic theory.
In the area of risky decision making we first reviewed recent studies that extend
our understanding of the link between a classical economic definition of risk
and risky decision making in everyday life. These studies have begun to unify
assessment of risk-taking in the neuroimaging laboratory with measurements
of risky behavior in the real world. As discussed, the interaction of a net-
work of brain regions related to cognitive control and a core valuation network
contribute to observed risk-taking behavior. Second, we discussed efforts to
test the predictions of prospect theory, the leading model of decision making
under risk, with neuroimaging data. Several studies have identified changes
of value related neural activity during decision making under risk that reflect
loss aversion, asymmetric weighting of probabilities and reference dependence,
central predictions of prospect theory. Finally, we reviewed leading theories of
intertemporal choice behavior and their neural correlates. While initial stud-
ies supported a dual process model of competing neural systems with different
sensitivity to delay, converging evidence points to a unified representation of
discounted value within a core valuation network.
While these advances and the contributions of related studies support
continued neuroimaging studies of economic decision making, the field faces
several challenges to inform the broader understanding of human behavior.
The rise of pattern classification techniques has shifted neuroimaging research
away from contrasting patterns of activity to understanding the representation
of information. Applied to economic decision making, these techniques could
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attempt to predict choice from patterns of neural activity. Studies have be-
gun to reveal information representation within a core valuation network, e.g.
(McNamee et al., 2013), but reliable prediction of economic choice will require
clever task design and analyses to isolate relevant neural signals (O’Doherty,
2014). Finally, neuroimaging data have provided crucial evidence to test the-
oretical accounts of economic decision making, but they have been slower to
contribute to refinement of economic theory. Further interdisciplinary work is
needed to advance normative accounts grounded in economic theory and con-
strained by their biological substrate. In the proceeding chapters, I present
a set of experiments designed to test the role of physical effort, a specific,




A Novel Task to Examine Effort-Based
Choices
2.1 Chapter Summary
This chapter provides an introduction to the behavioral paradigm and
models used throughout the experiments described thereafter. First, I describe
behavioral paradigms previously employed to assay effort-based valuation and
identify critical features that motivated the development of the prospective
effort paradigms used herein. I describe the core elements of the prospective
effort paradigm and present the results of three pilot studies designed to vali-
date it. With the paradigm established, Chapters 3 and 4 present experimental
work that evaluates effort-based decision making in the context of economic
choices under risk and delay.
2.2 Introduction
Effort is generally considered to decrease the value of an action. Adap-
tive organisms readily exert effort to achieve goals, but attempt to minimize
effort in doing so. Many behavioral experiments demonstrate discounting of
reward by effort in response rates to monetary and food rewards (Walton
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et al., 2006; Kool et al., 2010). In these studies, human and animal subjects
demonstrate reduced behavioral and neural signatures of value as the effort
required to achieve a reward increases. Valuation of rewards and costs are well
studied individually, but the understanding of their integration with effort re-
mains limited by a small number of accounts with often conflicting results. I
developed a novel approach to isolate and test the role of effort in establishing
subjective value from of a mixture of potential costs and rewards. First, I re-
view pertinent reports of reward and effort integration in the decision- making
literature, with a particular focus upon the involvement of dopamine (DA) and
norepinephrine (NE) systems and conclude with open questions addressed by
this proposal. The literature emphasizes these neuromodulatory systems and
a network of cortical and basal ganglia regions as the principal components of
a network that represents and integrates information about costs and benefits
to guide actions.
2.2.1 Valuation and the Dopamine in the Brain
Current theories of decision making propose an interaction of multi-
ple brain systems, with specialized circuits for representation and integration
of variables in sequential stages of an evolving choice (Rangel et al., 2008;
Padoa-Schioppa and Cai, 2011). The fundamental stages include representa-
tion of possible actions and states, valuation of actions, action selection and
outcome evaluation for learning and memory. Leading theories of the neu-
ral representation of reward implicate the mesolimbic dopaminergic system
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and its projections to prefrontal cortex in the motivation of effortful behav-
ior (Salamone and Correa, 2012). Theories concerning dopaminergic function
have evolved considerably since the initial link of dopamine to reward. Briefly,
study of the dopaminergic system initially suggested a general role in reward
and hedonic value, but evolved to include learning through prediction errors,
approach behavior, vigor control and salience (Wise, 2004). Two findings re-
garding the proposed role of dopamine in overcoming effort costs and control-
ling response rate are of particular interest for our proposal. Several studies
demonstrate that depletion of dopamine in the nucleus accumbens disrupts
instrumental responding if a high effort is required, but not if effort required
is minimal (Salamone et al., 2007). A review of this research proposed that
tonic dopamine levels in striatum reflect the average rate of reward in the en-
vironment, an important variable for an organism to infer benefits and control
response behavior (Niv, 2007). Diverse neuroimaging studies place representa-
tion of value in a network of dopamine associated prefrontal and basal ganglia
regions, centered upon the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral stria-
tum, supported by complimentary findings from single neuron recordings in
animals (Knutson, 2005). These studies suggest functional specialization of
reward processing, with accumbens encoding dopaminergic reward prediction
errors, and ventromedial frontal cortex encoding a general abstract reward
value that guides choice (Rangel and Hare, 2010; Lee, 2013).
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2.2.2 Neural Correlates of Valuation Processes
Neural correlates of processing loss and risk are less well defined than
reward, but studies commonly implicate the anterior insula, amygdala and cin-
gulate cortex with these costs (Liu et al., 2011; Palminteri et al., 2012). Sim-
ilarly, many reports describe different interactions between costs and benefits
in choice, including risk, probability, delay, and pain (Tom et al., 2007; Pes-
siglione et al., 2007; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Talmi et al., 2009). Generally,
these studies report modulation of value signals in cortical areas that reflect an
integration of these costs with reward. These studies suggest several cortical
areas as potential integrators of costs and benefits, including orbitofrontal cor-
tex, lateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (Rangel and Hare,
2010; Walton et al., 2007; Rogier B Mars and Yeung, 2011). Together with
studies of valuation, these studies highlight a network of regions implicated
in integration of certain costs and benefits in choice, critical for understand-
ing the distinct role of effort in similar choices. Similarly, a growing body of
work in the noradrenergic system encourages consideration of neurotransmit-
ters beyond dopamine upon choice. Anatomical connectivity and experimental
evidence supports an interplay between the norepinephrine and dopamine sys-
tems in decision making. For example, theoretical and experimental work sug-
gest reciprocal projections between cingulate cortex and the brainstem nucleus
locus coeruleus enable flexible control of broad attentional resources (Aston-
Jones and Cohen, 2005; Sara, 2009). While accessing brainstem dopamine
and norepinephrine activity remains difficult with neuroimaging, the revival
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of pupillometry provides an approach to infer activity in these regions (Nassar
et al., 2012).
2.2.3 Previous Effort-Based Neuroimaging Studies
Several recent human neuroimaging studies address the role of effort
in selecting an action and inform the experiments proposed here. Croxson
and colleagues investigated the location of blood oxygenation level dependent
(BOLD) signals associated with the subjective value of stimuli that represented
mixtures of monetary rewards and the number of movements required to earn
them, increasing cost in terms of both effort and time (Croxson et al., 2009).
In the absence of a choice, the authors found striatum activity correlated with
increasing reward and effort requirements. Another study similarly reported
higher striatal activity for choosing low effort over high effort, consistent with
effort discounting value (Kurniawan et al., 2010). A notable study that offered
forced choices between high or low efforts paired with high or low rewards also
found striatum to represent effort and delay-discounted reward and further
reported the integrated representation of effort and reward in the dorsal ACC
(Prevost et al., 2010). This study reported a negative interaction in ACC,
whereby increased activity reflects prospects that are more effortful, subjec-
tively less valuable. This result is consistent with a role for ACC in effort
previously shown in animal lesion studies. For example, a series of studies in
animals report damage to ACC but not OFC biases animals to select low-effort
options when a more rewarding high-effort option is available (Rudebeck and
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Murray, 2011). Single neuron studies implicate ACC in effort discounting of
reward as well, observing that ACC neurons increase their activity as mon-
keys face increasing action steps to reward (Shidara, 2002). A few studies also
implicate orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) as an integrator of costs and efforts in
choice or report modulation of activity at the level of motor effectors in ef-
fort tasks (Gershman et al., 2009; Wunderlich et al., 2009; Burke et al., 2013).
While this literature suggests effort contributes to decision related activity, the
dynamics of ongoing effort-based choices in humans remain largely unexam-
ined. A recent study suggests the decision to invest or withhold physical effort
relates to accumulating cost evidence in a proprioceptive region, the poste-
rior insula, consistent with an accumulator model previously demonstrated to
account for neural activity when considering monetary gains and losses alone
(Basten et al., 2010; Meyniel et al., 2013). In summary, these studies demon-
strate that effort-based decisions modulate prefrontal-striatal neural circuitry
implicated in valuation of options. However, no study to date has systemati-
cally isolated the behavioral and neural representation of effort as a cost and
compared it to other common costs in value-based decisions. To fully under-
stand the establishment of action value from mixtures of costs and benefits,
a novel model-driven approach of calibrated behavioral tasks and neuroimag-
ing is needed to characterize the specific influence and representation of effort
costs in these decisions.
27
2.3 A Prospective Effort Paradigm for Testing Effort-
Based Valuation
As reviewed in the previous section, effort-based decision making re-
search has proposed that energetic requirements generally reduce value signals
in cortex and reduce behavioral response rates. However, to date, there has
been no systematic separation of effort costs from other types of cost in mixed
outcome decisions. To address this confound, we designed an effort-based val-
uation task that asked subjects to make prospective decisions about physical
efforts. Critically, we trained subjects on a parametric physical effort task
prior to effort-based valuation. This prospective paradigm presents decision-
makers a trade-off between potential work and reward, an attempt to bring
effort-based valuation tasks closer to ethologically relevant decision-making
scenarios.
2.4 Pilot Experiments: Materials and Methods
2.4.1 Pilot Experiments: Participants
Three samples of healthy, right-handed subjects recruited from the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin community participated in the experiment. The first
pilot sample included 12 subjects (mean age = 19.6 years, standard deviation
= 3.4 years, 7 females). The second sample included 23 subjects (mean age
= 21.6 years, standard deviation = 1.32 years, 12 females). The third sample
included 15 subjects (mean age = 20.1 years, standard deviation = 2.51 years,
7 females). Informed consent was collected prior to the experiment. All par-
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ticipants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and reported no history
of psychiatric diagnoses, and neuralgic or metabolic illnesses. The Human
Subjects and Institutional Review Board at the University of Texas at Austin
approved all procedures.
2.5 Pilot Experiments: Behavioral Paradigm
The introduction and baseline force measurement protocol was identical
for all three experiments described in this chapter.
Stimuli and Introduction: Prior to the experiment, subjects provided
informed consent and were endowed with $10 cash. Subjects were instructed
that they were participating in a study about risk preferences in economic
choices. Stimulus presentation and response collection were implemented with
custom MATLAB code and the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997)
Baseline Force Measurement: First, subjects were prompted to squeeze
the dynamometer with their right hand as hard as possible in three intervals of
two seconds interspersed with periods of rest for two seconds. The calibration
procedure was performed without feedback or incentive. The average force
assessed by this procedure was considered the subject’s maximum voluntary
contraction (MVC) force for calibration of the training and test task phases.
After calibration, subjects were shown a display with real-time force feedback
for demonstration purposes.
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2.5.1 Pilot Experiments: Physical Effort Training
All training phases were designed to familiarize subjects with the dif-
ficulty of performing a range of effort levels. Subjects learned to associate
color and height cues with effort levels they performed, critical for subsequent
prospective effort choices. We altered the levels of effort in the physical effort
training phase across samples to achieve a range of success rates. A consis-
tent range of average parametric effort success was desired to test the effect of
prospective effort upon risk taking and delay discounting in future experiments
described in Chapters 3 and 4.
Experiment 1 Based on previous effort-based valuation studies that em-
ployed a physical grip paradigm, our first experiment tested subjects with four
levels of difficulty (30, 50, 70 and 90% of calibrated MVC, 80 randomized tri-
als, 20 trials of each difficulty level.) To successfully complete a trial, subjects
were required to exert force at or above the given effort level for at least 1
second within a 2 second response period. Subjects received real-time effort
feedback during production and success or failure to meet effort goal feedback
on a trial-by-trial basis.
Experiments 2 and 3 Based the results of experiment 1, we adjusted
our range of effort difficulty. Subjects were tested with five levels of effort
difficulty (30, 40, 50, 60 and 70% of calibrated MVC, 80 randomized trials, 20
trials of each difficulty level.) Again, to successfully complete a trial, subjects
were required to exert force at or above the given effort level for at least 1
second within a 2 second response period. Subjects received real-time effort
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feedback during production and success or failure to meet effort goal feedback
on a trial-by-trial basis.
2.5.2 Pilot Experiments: Prospective Effort Mixed Gambles
We adapted a mixed gambles paradigm to test the effects of prospective
effort attributes in a risky valuation task. In our first sample, we presented
mixed gambles at four levels effort and one level of fixed probability. Experi-
ments 2 and 3 presented five levels of prospective effort alone.
Experiment 1 During this phase, subjects were instructed to rate the
subjective attractiveness of prospective effort mixed gambles. Each mixed
gamble presented three components: a potential gain in addition to their en-
dowment ($2-$10 in six linearly spaced increments), and a potential loss from
their endowment ($1-$5 in six linearly spaced increments), contingent upon
performing one of five levels of effort as performed in the training session (30,
50, 70, and 90% of calibrated MVC) successfully five times in a row. See
figure 3.2 for an overview of the task. All 36 combinations of potential gain
and loss were presented at each of the four effort levels, 144 prospective effort
mixed-gamble trials in total. Additionally, we interspersed prospective effort
trials with trials from an identical 36 trial choice set that reflected no effort
prospect. Subjects were instructed that these trials offered an equal proba-
bility of gain or loss that would be resolved with a coin flip. Trial order and
inter-stimulus interval timing was determined from an efficiency calculation
for the prospective effort contrast that split 180 trials into five runs of 36 trials
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each. Potential gain and loss were subsequently randomized across all trials.
To encourage participants to reflect on the subjective attractiveness of each
mixed prospect rather than revert to a fixed decision rule (e.g., accept prospect
only if potential gain twice as large as potential loss), we asked subjects to
indicate one of four responses to each gamble (strongly accept, weakly accept,
weakly reject, and strongly reject) as quickly as possible with a standard key-
board. Subjects were instructed that one trial would be selected at random at
the end of the experiment and resolved according to their choice.
Experiment 2 and 3 During this phase, subjects were instructed to
rate the subjective attractiveness of prospective effort mixed gambles. Each
mixed-gamble presented three components: a potential gain in addition to
their endowment ($2-$10 in six linearly spaced increments), and a potential
loss from their endowment ($1-$5 in six linearly spaced increments), contingent
upon performing one of five levels of effort as performed in the training session
(30, 40, 50, 60 and 70% of calibrated MVC) successfully five times in a row.
All 36 combinations of potential gain and loss were presented at each of the
five effort levels, 180 prospective effort mixed-gamble trials in total. Trial
order was randomized to split 180 trials into five runs of 36 trials each. To
encourage participants to reflect on the subjective attractiveness of each mixed
prospect rather than revert to a fixed decision rule (e.g., accept prospect only
if potential gain twice as large as potential loss), we asked subjects to indicate
one of four responses to each gamble (strongly accept, weakly accept, weakly
reject, and strongly reject) as quickly as possible with a standard keyboard.
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Subjects were instructed that one trial would be selected at random at the
end of the experiment and resolved according to their choice.
2.6 Pilot Experiments: Behavioral Results
2.6.1 Effort Training Success
Increased effort requirements reduced subjects’ average performance on
individual trials during the effort grip force training phase, as depicted in figure
2.1. In our initial pilot sample, the highest effort prospect was too difficult for
many subjects to complete as required. Accordingly, we adjusted the range
of prospective value levels for our subsequent samples. In samples 2 and 3,












































30 50 70 90
Figure 2.1: Subjects’ average effort grip force performance reflect modulation by
effort level. Top, depcitions of effort cues tested during the training phase. (A)
Average training success in our initial pilot sample (n=12). (B) Average training
success in our second pilot sample (n=23). (C) Average training success in our final
pilot sample (n=13). Shaded color bars around group averages indicate standard
error of the mean.
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2.6.2 Prospective Effort Mixed Gambles
Subjects overall willingness to take gambles reflected an effect of prospec-
tive risk cost, whereby greater prospective effort reduced gamble acceptance.
Figure 2.2 illustrates overall behavior during the prospective effort mixed gam-
bles phase in our pilot samples. Overall, subjects willingness to accept gambles
reflected sensitivity to the ratio of gains and losses. However, subjects were
insensitive to expected value at extreme effort levels of prospective effort, such
as those examined in sample 1. In sample 1, subjects’ average gamble accep-
tance at equal probability of win or loss (coin flip) was similar to other studies
of valuation under risk (Tom et al., 2007; De Martino et al., 2010; Canessa
et al., 2013).
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Figure 2.2: Heatmaps depict average gamble preferences and median average re-
action times across levels of prospective effort or risk for all subjects. Each level is
represented with potential gains and losses collapsed across levels of gain and loss
magnitude. (A) Gamble behavior from our intital pilot sample reflected reduced
success with extreme prospective effort levels and consistent risk preferences in the
coin flip condition with previous studies. (B-C) Gamble behavior in subsequent
samples found a consistent relationship between willingness to face an effort chal-
lenge to resolve a gamble. Additionally, on average, subjects were sensitive to the
expected value of a gamble within an effort level.
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2.7 Discussion
We adapted a mixed gambles decision task from behavioral economics
to assess the influence of prospective effort upon choice. In multiple pilot
studies, we found reduced willingness to take risk under prospective effort
challenges. We developed this task to address a critical shortcoming in the
effort-based decision making literature, failure to separate choices about effort
from immediate effort production or anticipation of outcome. Our behavioral
results suggest that gamble behavior under carefully adjusted prospective ef-
fort reflects the imposition of a graded effort cost. In summary, the prospective
effort paradigm provides a novel approach to extend the literature of effort-
based valuation. In the following chapters, I describe two set of experiments
that directly test the effect of prospective effort costs upon well known aspects
of valuation, decision making under risk and delay.
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Chapter 3
Prospective Effort and Decision Making
Under Risk
3.1 Chapter Summary
This chapter describes an experiment designed to test the behavioral
and neural correlates of effort-based valuation with the prospective effort
paradigm described in the previous chapter. In this experiment, subjects re-
flected upon the value of monetary gamble prospects resolved by prospective
effort or risk challenges. Effort and risk were hypothesized to weigh upon
subjects valuation as a graded cost, reflected in choice behavior and neural ac-
tivity. Model-based analyses revealed behavioral and neural correlates of value
discounting associated with effort and risk and provide new evidence for the
general understanding of neural substrates of economic valuation processes.
The following text presents an adapted manuscript related to this experiment
currently in preparation for peer-review.
3.2 Abstract
Adaptive choice behavior in a dynamic world requires simultaneous
consideration of the energy expenditure of an action with other potential costs
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and benefits. Compared to risk and delay, the neural substrates of effort-based
valuation in economic decisions remain poorly understood. Previous human
neuroimaging studies suggest that effort-based decisions involve the ventral
striatum and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), structures previously impli-
cated in motivated behavior by animal studies. However, neuroimaging tasks
employed to localize effort valuation have typically confounded effort costs
with the delay to outcome or anticipation of subsequent effort production. To
resolve whether effort-based decisions specifically recruit these regions, we de-
signed a novel prospective effort choice task. Subjects underwent functional
neuroimaging while they decided to accept or reject gambles that offered the
opportunity to win or lose money. Gamble outcome was contingent upon per-
formance of one of five previously trained physical effort levels at the end of
the session. Increasing effort prospects associated with gambles reduced sub-
jects willingness to gamble and increased their sensitivity to potential losses
over potential gains. Prospective efforts costs were represented in the anterior
insular cortex, dorsal premotor cortex and motor planning areas. Prospective
effort representation overlapped with representation of potential gains in ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and gains and losses in medial frontal
cortex and motor planning areas. Contrary to previous reports in the hu-
man literature that focus upon ACC as the locus of effort-based valuation,
our results support a role for dorsal premotor structures in effort-based in-




Foraging, a fundamental animal behavior, requires balancing efforts
to obtain rewards(Rigoux and Guigon, 2012). When presented with choices
among actions, optimal behavior requires a valuation process that links actions
and potential outcomes to guide choice. Accordingly, animals are sensitive not
merely to expected rewards in choice tasks, but also effort requirements, such
as scaling a barrier or repeating an action (Salamone, 2009; Walton et al., 2006)
to obtain them. Effort describes the cost in energetic resources associated with
an action. It may involve cognitive or physical labor, each assumed to reflect a
limited capacity at the time of choice. Here, we focus upon the role of physical
effort in choice. Compared to other common costs like risk and temporal delay,
its influence upon the neural and behavioral correlates of valuation processes
remains poorly understood.
Leading theories of foraging behavior and economic decision making
propose that animals seek to minimize costs to maximize utility. To accom-
plish this, theoretical accounts and experimental evidence emphasize the for-
mation of abstract value signals from a cost-benefit analysis to guide choice
among alternatives. Neuroimaging and animal studies of valuation often iden-
tify value-related signals within a core network of basal ganglia and frontal
cortical regions. However, lesion studies in animals suggest that effort-based
valuation recruits distinct structures (Walton et al., 2007). For example, when
effort and delay costs are modulated independently, animals with lesions to
either ACC or orbital frontal cortex (OFC) exhibit selective impairment of
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valuation processes (Rudebeck et al., 2006). Additional evidence from rat and
human studies has linked activity within striatum to effortful behavior (Salam-
one et al., 2007; Croxson et al., 2009; Kurniawan et al., 2010; Schouppe et al.,
2014).
Together, these results support at least a partial dissociation of effort-
based valuation from other costs. However, effort-based tasks in human and
animal populations have typically confounded effort costs with delay and an-
ticipation of subsequent effort production. For example, notable effort-based
studies varied the number of actions required to obtain reward (Croxson et al.,
2009; Kennerley and Wallis, 2009). Even when effort cost is manipulated in-
dependently, neuroimaging studies have inconsistently ascribed effort-based
cost-benefit valuation to striatum (Croxson et al., 2009) ACC (Prevost et al.,
2010), insular cortex (Meyniel et al., 2013), and OFC (Burke et al., 2013). Fur-
thermore, these studies have not offered effort-based choices separated from
the resolution of an immediate outcome, nor addressed the potential confound
of decision difficulty and time spent on task. To address these issues, we de-
signed an fMRI experiment with a prospective effort paradigm that separated
effort-based valuation from effort execution, anticipation and reward receipt.
3.4 Materials and Methods
3.4.1 Participants
Forty-six healthy, right-handed subjects recruited from the University
of Texas at Austin community participated in the experiment. Six subjects
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were excluded from further analyses due to excessive head movement (2), MRI
artifacts (2) or failure to meet behavioral criteria described below (2). The
remaining forty subjects comprised the sample group for our fMRI analyses
(mean age = 22.4 years, standard deviation = 2.94 years, 20 females). Sam-
ple size was determined a priori by a power analysis for a contrast of interest
(parametric prospective effort) from a pilot study of 13 subjects (mean age =
21.3 years, standard deviation 2.31 years, 7 females) with the fMRIpower soft-
ware package (Mumford and Poldrack, 2014). Each subject provided informed
consent prior to the experiment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, reported no history of psychiatric diagnoses, and neuralgic or
metabolic illnesses. The Human Subjects and Institutional Review Board at
the University of Texas at Austin approved all experimental procedures.
3.4.2 Behavioral Paradigm
Stimuli and Introduction: Prior to the experiment, subjects were en-
dowed with $20 cash. Subjects were instructed that they were participating in
a study about preferences in economic choices. Stimuli presentation and sub-
ject response collection were implemented with custom MATLAB code and
the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997)
Baseline Force Measurement: Once inside the MRI scanner, each sub-
jects maximum voluntary contraction (MVC) force was assessed with an MR-
compatible dynamometer (BIOPAC TSD121B-MRI, BIOPAC Systems Inc.,
USA). Subjects were prompted to squeeze the dynamometer with their right
42
hand as hard as possible in three intervals of two seconds interspersed with
periods of rest for two seconds. The calibration procedure was performed
without feedback or incentive. The average force assessed by this procedure
was considered the subjects MVC for calibration of the training and test task
phases. After calibration, subjects were shown a display with real-time force
feedback for demonstration purposes.
Effort Training: The effort training phase is summarized in figure 3.1.
This phase was designed to familiarize subjects with the difficulty of perform-
ing a range of effort levels. Subjects learned to associate color and height cues
with effort levels they performed, critical for subsequent prospective effort
choices. Briefly, during the training run, subjects completed effort production
trials without incentive at five levels of difficulty (30, 40, 50, 60 and 70% of
calibrated MVC, 80 trials from one of 5 orders optimized for event-related
fMRI, 16 trials of each difficulty level.) To successfully complete a trial, sub-
jects were required to exert force at or above the given effort level for at least
1 second of total time within a 2 second response period. Subjects received
real-time feedback of effort provided during production and success or failure
to meet the effort goal on a trial-by-trial basis.
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Figure 3.1: Subjects were presented with one of 5 unique color and height lines
across a familiar grip force display (top left). When the stimulus was present,
subjects attempted to provide enough grip force to raise a red bar that reflected
the amount of force applied in real-time above the line. Subjects were required
to maintain a force level at or above the line for at least one second of total
time within a two second interval to successfully complete a trial. Success or
failure feedback was provided after each trial.
Prospective Effort Mixed Gambles: During this phase, subjects were
instructed to rate the subjective attractiveness of prospective effort mixed
gambles. Each mixed gamble presented three components: a potential gain in
addition to their endowment ($2-$12 in $2 increments), and a potential loss
from their endowment ($1-$6 in $1 increments), contingent upon performing
one of five levels of effort as performed in the training session (30, 40, 50,
60 and 70% of calibrated MVC) successfully five times in a row. See figure
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3.2 for an overview of the task. All 36 combinations of potential gain and
loss were presented at each of the five effort levels, 180 prospective effort
mixed gamble trials in total. Trial order and inter-stimulus interval timing was
determined from an efficiency calculation for the prospective effort contrast
that split 180 trials into 5 runs of 36 trials each (Kao et al., 2009). Potential
gain and loss were subsequently randomized across all trials. To encourage
participants to reflect on the subjective attractiveness of each mixed prospect
rather than revert to a fixed decision rule (e.g., accept prospect only if potential
gain twice as large as potential loss), we asked subjects to indicate one of
four responses to each gamble (strongly accept, weakly accept, weakly reject,
and strongly reject) as quickly as possible with a four-button response box.
Subjects were instructed that one trial would be selected at random at the
end of the experiment and resolved according to their choice.
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Figure 3.2: Subjects accepted or rejected the prospect of facing a monetary
gain or loss contingent upon successful performance of one of the 5 previously
trained effort levels. Combinations of potential gain and loss were drawn at
random for each effort level from an asymmetric choice set shown below.
Prospective Risk Mixed Gambles: During this phase, subjects were in-
structed to rate the subjective attractiveness of prospective risk mixed gam-
bles. Critically, by design this phase always followed the effort mixed gambles
phase. This order was intended to prevent subjects from reflecting upon effort
mixed gambles as effort-based prospects, rather than gambles with fixed win
probabilities. Each mixed-gamble presented three components: a potential
gain in addition to their endowment ($2-$12 in $2 increments), and a po-
tential loss from their endowment ($1-$6 in $1 increments), contingent upon
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one of five levels of win probability (10, 30, 50, 70 and 90% probability of
winning). See figure 3.3 for an overview of the task. As in the effort mixed
gambles task, all 36 combinations of potential gain and loss were presented
at each of the five risk levels, 180 prospective risk mixed-gamble trials in to-
tal. Trial order and inter-stimulus interval timing was determined from an
efficiency calculation for the prospective effort contrast that split 180 trials
into five runs of 36 trials each (Kao et al., 2009). Potential gain and loss were
subsequently randomized across all trials. To encourage participants to reflect
on the subjective attractiveness of each mixed prospect rather than revert to
a fixed decision rule (e.g., accept prospect only if potential gain twice as large
as potential loss), we asked subjects to indicate one of four responses to each
gamble (strongly accept, weakly accept, weakly reject, and strongly reject) as
quickly as possible with a four-button response box. Subjects were instructed
that one trial would be selected at random at the end of the experiment and
resolved according to their choice.
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Figure 3.3: Subjects accepted or rejected the prospect of facing a monetary
gain or loss contingent upon the resolution of one of five probabilities of win-
ning. Combinations of potential gain and loss were drawn at random for each
effort level from an asymmetric choice set shown below.
Confidence Ratings: After the mixed gambles phases and while still in
the scanner, subjects were asked to rate how confident they were that they
could perform each of nine levels of effort (spanning 10-90% of their MVC in
10% increments) five times in a row, as required to resolve gambles successfully
from the prospective effort mixed gamble phase.
Mixed Gamble Resolutions: At the end of the task, one trial was se-
lected at random from all effort mixed gambles. If the subject had accepted
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the selected gamble, they were required to attempt to successfully perform the
associated effort level five times in a row as practiced during the training phase.
If successful, a subject earned the amount of potential gain associated with
the trial. If they were not successful, the subject lost the amount of money
associated with potential loss from their initial endowment. As instructed at
the start of the experiment, if the subject had rejected the randomly selected
gamble, they were allowed to keep their initial endowment and the experiment
ended without additional effort production trials.
Figure 3.4: Subjects rated their confidence in performing a range of effort
levels as required in the prospective effort mixed gambles task.
3.4.3 Behavioral Analyses
Behavioral analyses focused upon preferences during prospective risk
and effort gamble evaluation. We tested subjects overall willingness to gamble
(proportion of gambles accepted) prior to other behavioral analyses. This test
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revealed two subjects that failed to meet a predetermined behavioral threshold
(accepted or rejected more than 95% of all gamble trials) and excluded them
from further analyses. From the training phase, we calculated mean response
accuracy (percentage of successful effort trials). From the prospective effort
gamble phase, we calculated acceptance rate by prospective effort, gain and
loss level, and reaction time in milliseconds. Statistical analyses (linear re-
gression analyses, ANOVAs and t tests) were performed with custom analyses
within MATLAB (The Mathworks, Natick, MA).
3.4.4 Image Acquisition
Imaging data were acquired on a 3 Telsa Skyra MRI scanner system
(Siemens) with a 32-channel head coil. Anatomical images for registration
to Montreal Neurological Institute template space were acquired with a high-
resolution magnetization prepared rapid gradient echo (MPRAGE) pulse se-
quence (TR = 1900 ms, TI = 900 ms, TE = 2.43 ms, flip angle = 9°, FOV =
256, voxel size 1.0 x 1.0 x 1.0 mm). Functional images were acquired collected
using a T2* weighted multiband (Moeller et al., 2010) echo-planar imaging
sequence (TR= 1000 ms, multiband acceleration factor= 4, iPAT parallel ac-
celeration factor = 2, TE=30 ms, flip angle = 63°, FOV=230, voxel size 2.4
x 2.4 x 2.4 mm). During functional scans, fifty-six gapless axial slices were
positioned 30°off the anterior commissure-posterior commissure line to reduce
frontal signal dropout (Deichmann et al., 2003). Higher-order shimming was
used to reduce susceptibility artifacts.
50
3.4.5 fMRI Data Preprocessing
Data preprocessing was performed in a custom analysis stream that
included components of the FreeSurfer and FSL neuroimaging analysis pack-
ages. First, raw imaging data in DICOM format were converted to NIFTI
format. Functional images were aligned with the FSL MCFLIRT tool to ob-
tain six motion parameters that correspond to the x-y-z translation and rota-
tion of the brain over time. Skull was removed from functional images with
the FSL brain extraction tool (BET ) and from T1-weighted MPRAGE images
with FreeSurfer (autorecon1 ). Spatial smoothing of functional images was per-
formed with a Gaussian kernel with a full-width half maximum of 5 mm. Data
and design matrices were high-pass filtered with a Gaussian-weighted least-
squares straight line fit with a cutoff period of 100 s. Grand-mean intensity
normalization of each functional image volumes entire four-dimensional data
set was performed by a single multiplicative factor. Each subjects functional
image volumes were registered to their T1-weighted MPRAGE volume with
a boundary-based registration method implemented in FSL5 (BBR). Each
subjects resulting T1-weighted image was then registered to the MNI152 2mm
template according to a linear registration algorithm implemented in FSL with
12 degrees of freedom (FLIRT ). These two registration steps were concate-
nated to obtain a functional-to-standard space registration matrix for each
functional image volume.
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3.4.6 fMRI Data Analyses
Whole-Brain Analyses We focused on the choice period to examine
neural activity related to prospective effort and valuation. We used gen-
eral linear models to assess the relationship of BOLD data to experimental
variables, model predictions and subjects choices. A whole-brain parametric
model (GLM1) modeled 3 orthogonal parametric regressors: prospective gain,
prospective loss, prospective effort level, to identify brain regions whose acti-
vation or deactivation correlated with the size of each variable. Reaction time
was modeled with two additional regressors: demeaned within-run average re-
action time and demeaned trial-by-trial reaction time minus within-run mean
reaction time (Mumford and Poldrack, 2014). Additional regressors of no in-
terest modeled trials without behavioral responses and unconvolved motion
parameters (x-y-z translation and rotation of the brain over time).
To further illustrate the interaction of prospective effort within regions
present in whole-brain parametric analysis (GLM1), we performed a second
whole-brain analysis (GLM2) that collapsed all trials by prospective effort
levels. Each subjects gamble trials were collapsed into a 3 × 3 matrix, whereby
each cell contained all trials from all levels of gain and loss. GLM2 modelled
trials from each matrix cell with a parametric effort prospect regressor and
additional regressors for reaction time and motion parameters as in GLM1.
A third whole-brain GLM analysis (GLM3) also collapsed all trials into a
3 × 3 matrix of gain and loss levels to test for mean activation related to
each of 9 combinations of gain and loss that reflect a range of expected value
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outcomes. Similarly, we included additional regressors for reaction time and
motion parameters as in GLM1.
Finally, a fourth and fifth set of whole-brain analyses (GLM4, GLM5)
modeled a parametric regressor for subjective value predicted by discount
model for the effort mixed gambles and risk mixed gambles phases. We cal-
culated a subjective value for each trial according to a generalized hyperbolic
discount function (Talmi and Pine, 2012):
SV =
Gain
1 + (Effort× Loss)
whereby subjective value (SV) reflects the size of potential gain, discounted by
effort and potential loss. Subjective value for risk mixed gambles followed a
separate discounting equation previously implicated in probability discounting
(Talmi and Pine, 2012):
SV = (Gain− Loss) × p(win)
whereby subjective value (SV) reflected the difference in potential gain and
loss multiplied by probability of winning for each gamble. Again, in each
subjective value model, we included additional regressors for reaction time
and motion parameters as in GLM1.
Region of Interest Analyses (GLM1): We tested for regionally specific
activations related to parametric regressors from GLM1 within several brain
areas reported in previous studies of effort-based valuation and valuation un-
der risk. These analyses are summarized below and in table 3.5.We tested
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several a priori ROIs for anticipation of gains, losses or effort based on peak
activations in previous tasks with similar designs. We first tested an a priori
ROI from the conjunction between increasing activity for increasing gains and
decreasing activity for decreasing losses from (Tom et al., 2007) around peak
MNI coordinates in mPFC (x = -6; y = 38; z = -10). Three additional a priori
ROIs were tested from (Canessa et al., 2013), anticipation of gains in bilateral
caudate nucleus (L, x = -14; y = 14; z = 10), (R, x = 18; y = 18; z = 2) and
anticipation of losses in bilateral insula lobe (L, x = -36; y = -14; z = 10), (R,
x = 36; y = -28; z = 18) and right amygdala (x = 28; y = 2; z = -10). We
also examined activity within a priori ROIs for anticipation of effort based on
previous effort-based valuation studies. These ROIs included two ACC ROIs
related to effort-discounted reward from (Croxson et al., 2009) (x = -12; y =
28; z = 14) and (Prevost et al., 2010) (x = 6; y = 24; z = 28), two SMA ROIs
related to anticipation of greater effort (x = -6; y = -7; z = 64) (Kurniawan
et al., 2013), (x = -9; y = 8; z = 52) (Burke et al., 2013), and a frontal pole
ROI related to evaluation of compound risk and effort trials (x = -9; y = 62;
z = 22) (Burke et al., 2013). All a priori ROIs were defined as one or two
(bilateral) 8 mm spheres centered at the peak MNI coordinates above.
Multivariate Pattern Analysis: A separate set of analyses applied machine-
learning algorithms to attempt to decode levels of prospective effort during
training and at choice in the prospective effort mixed gambles task. Due to
artifacts in the training data, one subject was disqualified from further anal-
ysis. Beta estimates from the remaining 39 subjects were obtained for each
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trial at the five levels of prospective effort. Whole-brain linear support vector
regression analyses within subject and across subjects were conducted with the
scikit-learn package in Python. Initial analyses were performed within-subject
on training data, with subjects’ data split into two halves for regression ma-
chine training and testing. For the cross-subject analyses, we sequentially
trained the regression machine with all runs of the prospective effort mixed
gambles task from 38 subjects. Finally, the regression machine was then tested
on labeling the remaining left out subject’s data.
Figure 3.5: Locations of spherical region of interest analyses based on previ-
ous effort-based valuation studies overlaid on axial sections of the MNI-152
template atlas. Spheres are colored according to the anatomical label in each
study. Green = striatum, caudate nucleus, pink = frontal polar cortex, red =
SMA, yelow = ACC, blue = insula lobe, and orange = right amygdala
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We also examined activations within three extensive anatomical ROIs
previously related to effort or valuation processes. These ROIs were defined
from unthresholded Harvard-Oxford atlas masks within FSL. These Harvard-
Oxford atlas masks included (1) a pre-hypothesized medial frontal cortex
(mPFC), and exploratory (2) combined insular cortex and frontal operculum
cortex, (3) exploratory combined paracingulate cortex, superior frontal gyrus,
juxtapositional lobule cortex (SMA) and cingulate gyrus (anterior division),
and (4) exploratory combined precentral gyrus and postcentral gyrus.
Region of Interest Analyses (GLM2, GLM3): To illustrate activity re-
lated to anticipation of effort at fixed levels of potential gains and losses, we
performed GLM analyses within functionally defined ROIs derived from the
results of GLM1. Functional ROIs were defined with the conjunction-null test
(Nichols et al., 2005) between individual statistical maps (p > 0.05, whole-
brain, cluster corrected) of activation for effort and activation for gains and
deactivation for losses, or activation for losses and deactivation for gains (refer
to table 3.4). These analyses were used to illustrate the direction of activa-
tion within these ROIs related to variance of outcomes and mean activation




3.5.1 Behavior: Effort Training
Increased effort requirements reduced subjects’ average performance
on individual trials during the effort grip force training phase, as depicted
in figure 3.1, (F (4,195) = 13.71, p <0.001). Subjects’ training behav-
ior was well described by a linear model whereby increased effort level pre-
dicted reduced training success: (β = −3.1, t(198) = −7.3, p < 0.001), ef-
fort level explained a significant portion of variance in training performance
(R2 = 0.21F = 53.1, p < 0.001). In post-task ratings of effort performance
confidence prior to effort mixed gamble resolution, increased effort require-
ments also reduced subjects’ average confidence, (F (8,351) = 20.1, p </
0.001), as depicted in figure 3.4. Similarly, we found that subjects’ post-
task confidence ratings were well described by a linear model whereby ef-
fort level predicted confidence: (β = −5.32, t(358) = −12.33, p < 0.001),
effort level explained a significant portion of variance in confidence ratings
(R2 = 0.30F = 152, p < 0.001). Figure 3.6 illustrates average training perfor-
mance and post-task confidence behavior across subjects.
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Figure 3.6: Subjects’ average effort grip force performance (light orange) and post-
task confidence ratings (dark orange) reflect modulation by effort level. The effort
cues tested during the training phase are depicted at top. Performance and ratings
for tested levels are shaded in gray. Shaded color bars around group averages indicate
standard error of the mean.
3.5.2 Behavior: Prospective Effort mixed gambles
Subjects overall willingness to take gambles reflected an effect of prospec-
tive effort cost over all levels of potential gain and loss (F (4,195) = 29.67, p
<0.001), whereby greater prospective effort reduced gamble acceptance. Fig-
ure 3.7 illustrates overall behavior during the prospective effort mixed gambles
phase. As expected, subjects’ willingness to accept the chance of performing
an effort to resolve a gamble reflect the level of prospective effort. Addition-
ally, subjects willingness to accept gambles reflected sensitivity to the ratio
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of gains and losses. Subjects’ reaction times scaled with the size of the ex-
pected value and level of prospective effort. Generally, the longest median
average reaction times were associated with prospective effort mixed gambles
that subjects were on average closer to indifference (50% acceptance rate).
Figure 3.7: Heatmaps depict average gamble preferences and median average reac-
tion times across levels of prospective effort for all subjects. Each level is represented
with potential gains and losses collapsed across magnitude. Generally, increasing
effort prospects reduce willingness to accept prospective effort gambles.
3.5.3 Behavior: Prospective Risk mixed gambles
As expected, subjects overall willingness to take gambles reflected an
effect of prospective risk cost over all levels of potential gain and loss (F (4,195)
= 24.41, p <0.001), whereby greater prospective effort reduced gamble ac-
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ceptance. Figure 3.8 illustrates overall behavior during the prospective risk
mixed gambles phase. As in the previous prospective effort mixed gambles
phase, subjects willingness to accept gambles reflected sensitivity to the ra-
tio of gains and losses. However, subjects were more sensitive to the range
of prospective risk levels than prospective effort levels, illustrated by greatly
reduced or increased average acceptance rates at extreme risk levels. Subjects’
average gamble acceptance at equal probability of win or loss was similar to
other studies of valuation under risk (Tom et al., 2007; Canessa et al., 2013;
De Martino et al., 2010) Subjects’ reaction times scaled with the size of the
expected value and level of prospective effort. Across subjects, the longest nor-
malized reaction times were associated with prospective effort mixed gambles
that subjects were on average closer to indifference (50% acceptance rate), as
illustrated in figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.8: Heatmaps depict average gamble preferences and median average reac-
tion times across levels of prospective risk for all subjects. Each level is represented
with potential gains and losses collapsed across magnitude. Generally, increasing
effort prospects reduce willingness to accept prospective risk gambles.
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Figure 3.9: Normalized reaction times (median-mean) plotted against average gam-
ble acceptance rate for effort mixed gambles (left) and risk mixed gambles (right).
Reaction times scaled with acceptance rate, with the slowest reaction times associ-
ated with distance from indifference. The model fit of parabolic function in red is
centered at 0.5 acceptance rate.
3.6 Neuroimaging Results: Prospective Effort Mixed
Gambles
3.6.1 Whole-Brain Parametric Analysis
We first examined neuroimaging data with parametric regression anal-
ysis to identify brain regions where activity increased or decreased linearly
with the magnitude of gain, loss, or effort. Our analyses focused on the time
of prospective gamble choice and accounted for reaction time average within
run and on a trial-by-trial basis (Mumford and Poldrack, 2014). This analysis
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isolated a set of regions whose activation correlated with the size of potential
gain, loss and effort. The results of this analysis are summarized in table 3.1
and figure 3.10. All statistical analyses presented survived whole-brain cluster
correction at a significance threshold of p <0.05. The gain-responsive network
included several regions previously related to anticipation and receipt of pri-
mary and secondary rewards. We found increased activation for increasing
gains within vmPFC, frontal pole, striatum, and posterior cingulate cortex, as
well as supplementary motor areas and right primary somatosensory and mo-
tor cortex, ipsilateral to effort production. We found decreasing activity within
the left dorsolateral frontal cortex. The loss-responsive network included areas
previously unreported in mixed-gamble studies. This network increased acti-
vation with the size of potential losses and included right dorsolateral PFC,
frontal pole, inferior parietal lobule, primary motor and somatosensory cor-
tex, and superior frontal gyrus in the vicinity of the cingulate motor area
hand representation. Finally, the effort-responsive network included regions
that increased or decreased with the magnitude of prospective effort present
at choice. This network included increasing activation in left anterior insula














Figure 3.10: Whole-brain analysis of parametric responses to size of potential gain
(top), loss (middle) and effort (bottom). Statistical maps are projected onto an
average cortical surface by multifiducial mapping in CARET software. All statistical
maps were corrected for multiple comparisons at the whole-brain level by means of
cluster-based Guassian random field theory in FSL at p < 0.05. L, left hemisphere;
R, right hemisphere
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Harvard-Oxford Atlas Structural Label L/R extent (voxels) MNI peak coordinates z-stat
x y z
Increasing activation for increasing gains
Superior frontal gyrus, Middle frontal gyrus, Left 1171 -24 32 28 4.08
Occipital pole Bilateral 37794 14 -96 4 5.49
Posterior cingulate cortex Right 4 -24 48 5.4
Frontal pole Right 24 36 -12 4.76
Medial frontal cortex Bilateral 6 42 -6 4.21
Precentral gyrus, postcentral gyrus Right 34 -26 64 4.08
Caudate Right 8 8 -2 3.9
Increasing activation for increasing losses
Frontopolar cortex Right 312 20 42 -14 4.29
Inferior parietal lobule Right 679 58 -50 42 4.28
Superior frontal gyrus Bilateral 901 8 26 60 4.17
Precentral gyrus, postcentral gyrus Left 514 -34 -30 48 4.06
Occipital fusiform gyrus Left 474 -18 -84 -8 3.77
Middle temporal gyrus Right 318 54 -28 -8 3.56
Middle frontal gyrus Right 661 42 28 30 3.38
Increasing activation for increasing efforts
Anterior insula, inferior frontal gyrus, frontal operculum cortex Left 641 -56 22 2 3.97
Decreasing activation for increasing gains
Inferior frontal gyrus, frontal operculum cortex, frontal pole Left 539 -46 36 -12 3.5
Decreasing activation for increasing efforts
Occipital pole, lateral occipital cortex Left 855 -14 -92 20 4.32
Precentral gyrus, postcentral gyrus Right 527 34 -24 50 3.18
Table 3.1: Regions showing significant increasing activation or deactivation accord-
ing to the size of the prospective gain, loss or effort on offer. The table includes
main clusters and the Harvard-Oxford atlas labels that correspond to the location
of the peak voxel. Peak voxel listed at x-y-z location in MNI space.
In our second parametric regression analysis, we identified brain regions
where activity increased or decreased linearly with a subjective value model
prediction. Again, our analyses focused on the time of prospective gamble
choice and accounted for reaction time average within run and on a trial-by-
trial basis (Mumford and Poldrack, 2014). The results of this analysis are
summarized in table 3.2 and figure 3.11. All statistical analyses presented
survived whole-brain cluster correction at a significance threshold of p <0.05.
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The increasing with subjective value network included several regions previ-
ously related to anticipation and receipt of primary and secondary rewards.
We found increased activation for increasing subjective value within vmPFC,
frontal pole, striatum, and posterior cingulate cortex, as well as supplementary
motor areas and right primary sensory and motor cortex. We found decreasing
activity for increasing subjective value within bilateral dorsal frontal cortex,
including premotor areas, as well as left lateral prefrontal cortex, right poste-
rior parietal cortex and primary left motor cortex.
A similar analysis examined activation related to subjective value pre-
diction in the probability mixed gambles task. The results of this analysis
are summarized in table 3.2 and figure 3.11. All statistical analyses pre-
sented survived whole-brain cluster correction at a significance threshold of
p <0.05. This analysis revealed only significant activation for increasing sub-
jective value, within a broad network of visual and motor regions, as well as










Figure 3.11: Whole-brain analysis of parametric responses to size predicted subjec-
tive value for each gamble. Statistical maps are projected onto an average cortical
surface by multifiducial mapping in CARET software. All statistical maps were cor-
rected for multiple comparisons at the whole-brain level by means of cluster-based
Guassian random field theory in FSL at p < 0.05. L, left hemisphere; R, right
hemisphere
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Harvard-Oxford Atlas Structural Label L/R extent (voxels) MNI peak coordinates z-stat
x y z
Increasing activation for increasing subjective value
Lateral occipital cortex, posterior temporal cortex Left 5726 -46 -52 4 5.49
Occipital cortex Right 2528 22 -94 6 4.64
Posterior cingulate gyrus Right 2348 24 36 -12 4.99
Medial frontal cortex Bilateral 1665 4 44 -10 4.61
Supramarginal gyrus, posterior division Right 803 56 -42 22 4.26
Accumbens Right 524 10 10 -4 4.03
Cingulate gyrus, posterior division Left 454 -14 -32 40 4.28
Paracingulate gyrus Left 411 -12 36 26 3.57
Decreasing activation for increasing subjective value
Superior frontal gyrus Bilateral 1489 10 28 62 5.03
Frontal pole Left 880 -44 50 -8 3.94
Angular gyrus Right 509 40 -40 40 3.30
Postcentral gyrus Left 431 -46 -30 56 3.47
Table 3.2: Regions showing significant increasing activation or deactivation accord-
ing to the size of the subjective value estimate. The table includes main clusters and
the Harvard-Oxford atlas labels that correspond to the location of the peak voxel.
Peak voxel listed at x-y-z location in MNI space.
3.6.2 Anatomical Region of Interest Analysis
We next investigated whether activity within anatomical regions pre-
viously reported in effort-based valuation studies related to our parametric
regressors. We separately constrained our parametric analysis to anatomical
regions of interest (ROIs) defined by the Harvard-Oxford Anatomical Atlas.
These regions included (1) frontal medial cortex, (2) a combined cingulate-
frontal mask of juxtapositional lobule cortex (SMA), cingulate cortex (anterior
division), superior frontal gyrus and paracingulate gyrus, and (3) a somatomo-
tor mask of combined precentral gyrus and postcentral gyrus. The anatomical
location of these ROIs is illustated in figure 3.12. The results of this analysis
are summarized in table 3.3. We found additional regions that did not survive
cluster correction in the whole-brain analysis. Increasing gain and loss activa-
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tion clusters were present in all three anatomical ROIs, cluster size corrected at
p <0.05. Increasing effort activation clusters were present within the combined
cingulate-frontal anatomical somatomotor ROIs. We found decreasing gain
activation within the cingulate-frontal and somatomotor ROIs and decreasing
effort activation within frontal medial cortex and the cingulate-frontal ROI.
These spatial overlap of these clusters was examined in a conjunction analysis
described below.
Region of interest L/R extent (voxels) MNI peak coordinates z-stat
x y z
Increasing activation for increasing gains
Frontal medial cortex Bilateral 452 6 42 -8 4.11
Combined SMA, ACC, SFG, PCG Bilateral 253 4 16 28 4.21
Bilateral 222 2 -4 62 3.51
Combined precentral gyrus, postcentral gyrus Bilateral 3272 8 -22 50 4.93
Right 36 -22 46 3.89
Increasing activation for increasing losses
Frontal medial cortex Right 102 14 44 -12 3.6
Combined SMA, ACC, SFG, PCG Bilateral 778 8 26 60 4.17
Combined precentral gyrus, postcentral gyrus Left 501 -34 -30 48 4.06
Increasing activation for increasing efforts
Combined SMA, ACC, SFG, PCG Bilateral 307 -6 6 72 3.61
Combined precentral gyrus, postcentral gyrus Left 326 -44 -30 54 3.28
Decreasing activation for increasing gains
Combined SMA, ACC, SFG, PCG Left 262 -8 22 56 3.55
Right 222 16 28 58 4.62
Decreasing activation for increasing efforts
Frontal medial cortex Bilateral 84 -4 44 -12 3.08
Combined precentral gyrus, postcentral gyrus Right 526 34 -24 50 3.18
Table 3.3: Regions showing significant increasing activation or deactivation accord-
ing to the size of the prospective gain, loss or effort on offer. The table includes
main clusters and the Harvard-Oxford atlas labels that correspond to the loca-
tion of the peak voxel: ACC, Anterior cingulate gyrus; PCG, paracingulate gyrus;
SMA,supplementary motor area; SFG, superior frontal gyrus. Peak voxels listed at
x-y-z location in MNI space.
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Figure 3.12: Anatomical ROIs used for secondary parametric regression analysis.
(A) somatomotor mask of combined precentral gyrus and postcentral gyrus, (B)
frontal medial cortex and (C) combined cingulate-frontal mask of juxtapositional
lobule cortex (SMA), cingulate cortex (anterior division), superior frontal gyrus and
paracingulate gyrus. ROI masks are projected onto an average cortical surface by
multifiducial mapping in CARET software. L, left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere
3.6.3 Anatomical Region of Interest Conjunction Analyses
We performed conjunction analyses on the statistical maps obtained in
the anatomical region of interest analysis to search for brain regions in which
activity during choice correlated with two or more of our parametric regressors.
Table 3.4 summarizes the results of this analysis. Within frontal medial cortex,
we found a conjunction between increasing activity for increasing potential
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gains and decreasing activity for increasing prospective effort, illustrated in
figure 3.13.
R
z = -12 y = -24
RR
Figure 3.13: Parametric analyses within anatomical ROIs revealed a conjunction
between sensitivity for gain and effort within medial frontal cortex (left) and right
somatomotor cortex. Within ROI statistical maps are projected onto an average
cortical surface by multifiducial mapping in CARET software. L, left hemisphere;
R, right hemisphere
Within the somatomotor cortex mask, we found a conjunction between
increasing activation for increasing gains and deactivation for increasing efforts
in the right hemisphere, and increasing activation for both increasing gain and
effort in the left hemisphere. Within the cingulate-frontal mask, we observed a
bilateral three-way conjunction between aversive components of mixed gambles
71
in premotor cortex: increasing activation for effort and loss and decreasing
activation for increasing gain. See figure 3.14 for reference. All clusters entered
into conjunction analyses were cluster size corrected at p <0.05 within their
respective anatomical ROI masks.
Figure 3.14: Parametric analyses within anatomical ROIs revealed a three-way
conjunction between sensitivity for gain, loss and effort within bilateral premotor
cortex. Within ROI statistical maps are projected onto an average cortical surface
by multifiducial mapping in CARET software. L, left hemisphere
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Harvard-Oxford Atlas Structural Label L/R extent (voxels) MNI peak coordinates z-stat
x y z
Increasing activation for gains, decreasing activation for efforts
Postcentral gyrus, postcentral gyrus Right 344 34 -24 50 3.18
Frontal medial cortex Bilateral 65 -2 44 -12 3.05
Increasing activation for losses, decreasing activation for gains
Superior frontal gyrus Left 94 -6 24 58 3.54
Superior frontal gyrus Right 96 12 24 58 3.53
Increasing activation for losses, increasing activation for efforts
Precentral gyrus, postcentral gyrus Left 95 -42 -30 56 3
Superior frontal gyrus Left 24 -4 26 56 2.85
Increasing activation for efforts, decreasing activation for gains
Superior frontal gyrus Left 62 -8 22 62 2.84
Increasing activation for efforts, decreasing activation for gains
Superior frontal gyrus Left 62 -8 22 62 2.84
Table 3.4: Regions conjointly significantly increasing activation or deactivation
according to the size of the prospective gain, loss or effort on offer. Within ROI sta-
tistical maps are projected onto an average cortical surface by multifiducial mapping
in CARET software. L, left hemisphere
3.6.4 Foci of Previous Effort-Based Valuation Studies
We also tested for parametric effects of gain, loss or effort within spher-
ical rois created at foci of peak activation in previous valuation neuroimaging
studies relevant to our behavioral paradigm. Table 3.5 summarizes the re-
sults of this analysis. We performed one-tailed t-tests of all subjects mean
parameter estimate within each ROI, false discovery rate corrected for mul-
tiple comparisons. Of the nine ROIs tested, only the vmPFC ROI of (Tom
et al., 2007) survived a statistical of p <0.05.
73
Region of interest L/R ROI extent (voxels) MNI coordinates mean parameter etimate t-stat p-value (FDR corrected)
x y z
Activation for potential gains
Canessa (2013) - Caudate Nucleus Bilateral 514 -14 14 10 1.07 1.89 0.189
18 18 2
Tom (2007) vmPFC Left 257 -6 38 -10 3.13 3.48 0.009
Activation for potential losses
Canessa (2013) - Insular cortex Bilateral 514 -36 -14 10 0.36 0.39 0.789
36 -28 18
Canessa (2014) - Amygdala Right 257 28 2 -10 0.73 0.55 0.75
Activation for prospective effort
Burke (2013) - Frontopolar cortex Left 257 -9 62 22 0.48 0.24 0.814
Croxson (2009) - ACC Left 257 -12 28 14 -1.82 -2.17 0.162
Prvost (2010) - ACC Right 257 6 24 28 3.01 1.51 0.306
Burke (2013) - SMA (L) Left 257 -9 8 52 1.43 1.02 0.561
Kurniawan (2013) - SMA Left 257 -6 -7 64 1.2 0.65 0.751
Table 3.5: Regions showing significant increasing activation or deactivation accord-
ing to the size of the prospective gain, loss or effort on offer. The table includes
main clusters and the Harvard-Oxford atlas labels that correspond to the location
of the peak voxel. Peak voxel listed at x-y-z location in MNI space.
3.6.5 Anatomical Region of Interest Conjunction Matrix Analysis
To illustrate the sensitivity to expected value within brain regions iden-
tified with whole-brain analysis, we examined overall task evoked responses
and average parametric effort responses to combinations of gain and loss across
all levels of effort within the five regions present in our anatomical conjunction
analysis: vmPFC, left and right premotor cortex, left and right somatomotor
cortex. As illustrated in figure 3.15, each cell of each matrix represents the
average evoked response within the ROI for a combination of potential gain
and loss trials across all subjects. Within vmPFC, we found a pattern of in-
creased average evoked response as the size of expected value increased. We
also found patterns of average evoked response sensitive for potential gains,
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but not losses within the somatomotor ROIs. The average parametric effort
response patterns exhibited less sensitivity to expected value across the ma-
trix, with a weak pattern of increased activation for increasing gains in left
and right premotor cortex.
Figure 3.15: Average task evoked response and average parametric effort response
for 9 combinations of potential gain and loss were estimated within five ROIs present
in conjunction analysis. Blue regions indicate location of ROIs projected onto an
average cortical surface by multifiducial mapping in CARET software. Heatmaps
depict average evoked response (z-scored) to combinations of gain and loss within
each ROI. L, left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere
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3.7 Neuroimaging Results: Prospective Risk Mixed Gam-
bles
We similarly examined neuroimaging data from the prospective risk
phase with parametric regression analysis to identify brain regions where ac-
tivity increased or decreased linearly with the magnitude of gain, loss, or risk.
Our analyses focused on the time of prospective gamble choice and accounted
for reaction time average within run and on a trial-by-trial basis (Mumford and
Poldrack, 2014). This analysis isolated a set of regions whose activation corre-
lated with the size of potential gain, loss and risk. Figure 3.16 illustrates the
results of this analysis. All statistical maps were cluster corrected at a signifi-
cance threshold of p <0.05. Unlike the prospective effort mixed gambles task,
gain-responsive network included only a small region of vmPFC. Instead, the
gain-responsive network included bilateral caudate, cingulate cortex, dlPFC,
as well as supplementary motor areas and right primary somatosensory and
motor cortex, ipsilateral somatomotor areas. The loss-responsive network con-
sisted of only left anterior insula cortex and posterior temporal cortex. The
risk-responsive network included extensive regions of bilateral somatomotor
cortex, cingulate cortex and vmPFC.
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Figure 3.16: Whole-brain analysis of parametric responses to size of potential gain
(top), loss (middle) and risk (bottom). Statistical maps are projected onto an
average cortical surface by multifiducial mapping in CARET software. All statistical
maps were corrected for multiple comparisons at the whole-brain level by means of
cluster-based Guassian random field theory in FSL at p < 0.05. L, left hemisphere;
R, right hemisphere
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3.8 Multivariate Decoding of Prospective Effort Cost
Whole-brain support vector regression analyses within subject and across
subjects was not able to predict prospective effort level at choice greater than
chance with a linear support vector regression (SVR) analysis. As depicted
in figure 3.17, predicted labels did not accurately label the level of prospec-
tive effort present at choice and the correlation between each subject’s SVR
estimates and true effort level labels was not greater than chance.




























































Figure 3.17: Whole-brain analysis support vector regression analyses failed to ac-
curately label the level of prospective effort present at choice. Red lines indicate
average predictions for each level of effort. Gray circles depict each subject’s left
out label prediction. Shaded areas indicate standard error of the mean.
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3.9 Discussion
We report novel evidence for modulation of behavioral and neural cor-
relates of value by prospective effort, a construct of action cost separated
from production. We asked subjects to decide whether to risk performing
a previously trained level of physical effort in order to resolve a monetary
mixed-gamlbe. In the absence of immediate effort anticipation, we found that
activity in a network of motor-related cortical areas reflected conjoint sensi-
tivity to potential outcomes and action costs. Additionally, activity within
medial frontal cortex generally regarded to reflect subjective value at choice
related to both increasing expected value and effort cost, a pattern akin to a
neural signal for discounted value. We confirm the involvement of prospective
effort in the neural estimation of value, a common aspect of decision making
in a dynamic world.
Prospective Effort Reflects a Cost in Valuation Consistent with previ-
ous effort-based valuation studies in humans and animal populations, we found
that subjects choices and neural activity reflect a discounting of value by effort
(Croxson et al., 2009; Prevost et al., 2010; Kurniawan et al., 2013; Burke et al.,
2013). In addition to reducing subjects’ willingness to take risk for rewards,
prospective effort costs increased subjects sensitivity to losses over equivalent
gains. Neural activity during choice reflected conjoint sensitivity to expected
value and prospective effort cost, reflected in modulation of BOLD signals
within medial frontal cortex, a region implicated as the locus of abstract sub-
jective value estimates necessary for decision making among alternatives with
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multiple attributes (Rangel and Hare, 2010; Padoa-Schioppa and Cai, 2011;
Wallis and Kennerley, 2011).
Prospective Effort-Based Decision Making Recruits Brain Regions
Related to Action Selection and Production Studies of valuation pro-
cesses in humans and animals consistently identify a network of frontal dom-
paminergic regions, including striatum, anterior cingulate cortex and vmPFC.
These studies suggest that within this broad network, striatum, ACC and
orbital frontal cortex may selectively process information related to decision
processes under effort or delay, (Walton et al., 2006; Rushworth et al., 2007;
Prevost et al., 2010). However, recent studies suggest that relationship be-
tween these regions and effort-based valuation may reflect task-specific de-
mands, rather than a general decision making role (Euston, 2014). For exam-
ple, effort-based valuation studies often confound effort cost with anticipation
or delay to outcome incurred by effort exertion. Similarly confounding the
interpretation of ACC in these tasks, a recent review found a strong rela-
tionship between reports of ACC activation and several correlates of choice
difficulty (Shenhav et al., 2014). Furthermore, previous neuroimaging studies
inconsistently report effort-based activation as ACC-related, often including
dorsal premotor areas shown to contain neurons sensitive to action valuation
and execution in animal models (Cowen et al., 2012; Hosokawa et al., 2013).
Our parametric regression analysis did not reveal a modulation of activity
within ACC by prospective effort, even when the analysis was restricted to an
anatomical mask or foci of previously reported effort-responsive activations.
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Instead, we found conjoint sensitivity to effort, gain and loss within dorsal
supplementary motor areas, consistent with their proposed role in the integra-
tion of action planning and expected outcomes. We found additional spatially
distinct encoding of prospective effort in anterior insula cortex, a region sep-
arately related to risk and effort in previous mixed gamble and effort-based
valuation studies (Canessa et al., 2013; Burke et al., 2013). Intriguingly, this
conjoint activity pattern follows the predictions of the affordance competition
hypothesis (Cisek, 2012) whereby activity within structures related to action
selection should reflect expected outcome, even without immediate action pro-
duction. Similarly, our subjective value prediction analysis found a network
of striatum, sensory motor, medial frontal and dorsal premotor regions re-
lated to effort-based valuation. As discussed in Chapter 5, our results notably
follow previous effort-based tasks that presented choices in not reporting sig-
nificant involvement of ACC in effort-based valuation (Kurniawan et al., 2013;
Schouppe et al., 2014). Additional analysis of model-based expected value
may further resolve the contribution of cingulate and motor regions in our
prospective effort task.
A Novel Nudge for Understanding Motivated Behavior In summary,
our results provide a novel perspective on effort-based valuation in the human
brain. Our data suggest the relationship of the regions previously related to
effort-based valuation may reflect more complex task demands than previous
addressed. We extend previous findings of valuation under risk and s found
that the addition of prospective effort costs recruits neural structures for action
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selection and production and regions related to subjective value in prefrontal
cortex and striatum. Separate encoding of costs in effort-based choice may
have evolved from pressure to weigh decision costs differently. Extension of
prospective effort to naturalistic tasks may provide additional evidence for neu-
ral substrates of decision costs to inform models of impulsivity and anhedonia,
common traits of disordered cognitive processing.
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Chapter 4
Prospective Effort and Intertemporal Choice
4.1 Chapter Summary
Intertemporal choice describes decision making between two or more
options whose outcomes differ in the time at which they will occur. Deci-
sions about of the future consequences of present actions comprise a funda-
mental type of valuation. As reviewed in Chapter 1, behavioral and neural
evidence suggests that delay-based valuation reflects a process of discounting
future outcomes over immediate ones. The commonality of neural systems
for intertemporal choice and effort-based valuation remains unclear. Criti-
cally, limited accounts of effort-based decision making typically utilize effort
paradigms that incur delays to action or outcome, a confound that remains
largely unaccounted for in human studies. This chapter describes two similar
experiments designed to extend the prospective effort paradigm in the domain
of intertemporal choice. We hypothesized that prospective effort challenges
paired with intertemporal choices in a dual-task paradigm would parametri-
cally alter subjects’ preferences for delayed rewards. Following the prospec-
tive effort calibration and training phases described in Chapter 2, we assessed
baseline temporal discounting rates in healthy subjects. We then asked them
to make a second set of intertemporal choices associated with a separately
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resolved prospective effort challenge. Overall, subjects’ discount preferences
were not modulated by the level of prospective effort paired with intertempo-
ral choices. Finally, I discuss our results with emphasis upon new potential
directions and limitations of the prospective effort paradigm in this domain.
4.2 Introduction
Adaptive decision making necessitates a valuation process to select
among potential options on the basis of their potential costs and benefits.
Theoretical and experimental accounts suggest that this process links value to
alternatives under consideration according to internally generated estimates of
expected outcomes, reflected in behavioral and neural correlates of value. This
approach provides the basis of understanding intertemporal choice, common
decisions among alternatives that differ in the delay to their outcome. Exten-
sive work in economics and behavioral psychology describes that when faced
with intertemporal choices, decision makers valuation of future options reflects
a discounting process. As discussed in section 1.2.6, intertemporal choice stud-
ies generally offer subjects a series of binary alternatives, smaller sooner (SS)
or larger later (LL) prospects. Choice behavior in this task enters a regression
model, whereby indifference points between SS and LL options fit a hyper-
bolic function (Mazur, 1987). The estimated discount parameter k describes
the hyperbolic function from this analysis and enables comparisons between
experimental conditions. Finally, a single choice, randomly selected at the end
of the study, provides participants their selected SS or LL prospect. In the
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present study, we adapted this well established method of intertemporal choice
preference estimation with our prospective effort paradigm to examine it as
a potential modulator of delay discounting behavior. We hypothesized that
a dual-task paradigm of intertemporal choices paired with prospective effort
challenges would modulate k, an estimate of individual temporal discounting
preferences. I present the background and results of two studies designed to
test this hypothesis below, and conclude with comments on the utility of the
prospective effort paradigm in the study of intertemporal choice.
4.3 Materials and Methods
4.3.1 Participants
Two samples of healthy, right-handed subjects recruited from the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin community participated in the experiment. The
first sample included 23 subjects (mean age = 20.2 years, standard deviation
= 1.92 years, 15 females). The second sample included 27 subjects (mean age
= 21.4 years, standard deviation = 2.21 years, 19 females). Informed con-
sent was collected prior to the experiment. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, and reported no history of psychiatric diagnoses,
and neuralgic or metabolic illnesses. The Human Subjects and Institutional
Review Board at the University of Texas at Austin approved all procedures.
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4.3.2 Behavioral Paradigm
Stimuli and Introduction: Prior to the experiment, subjects provided
informed consent and were endowed with $5 cash. Subjects were instructed
that they were participating in a study about preferences between delay, work
and reward . Stimulus presentation and response collection were implemented
with custom MATLAB code and the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997)
Baseline Force Measurement: First, subjects were prompted to squeeze
the dynamometer with their right hand as hard as possible in five intervals of
two seconds interspersed with periods of rest for two seconds. The calibration
procedure was performed without feedback or incentive. The average force
assessed by this procedure was considered the subject’s MVC for calibration
of the training and test task phases. After calibration, subjects were shown a
display with real-time force feedback for demonstration purposes.
Effort Training: The effort training phase was from adapted the effort
training paradigm detailed in the previous chapter and summarized in figure
3.1. This phase was designed to familiarize subjects with the difficulty of per-
forming a range of effort levels. Subjects learned to associate color and height
cues with effort levels they performed, critical for subsequent prospective ef-
fort choices. Subjects completed five blocks of effort production trials without
incentive at five levels of difficulty (30, 40, 50, 60 and 70% of calibrated MVC,
80 trials from one of 5 orders optimized in preparation for event-related fMRI,
16 trials of each difficulty level.) To successfully complete a trial, subjects
were required to exert force at or above the given effort level for at least 1
86
second within a 2 second response period. Subjects received real-time effort
feedback during production and success or failure to meet effort goal feedback
on a trial-by-trial basis. Additionally, subjects were told how many effort trials
remained in each block, and allowed to rest between briefly between blocks.
4.3.3 Interempotral Choice: Calibration
Intertemporal Choice: Subjects were instructed to select their preferred
alternative in a series of intertemporal choices. All subjects completed two
sequential blocks of intertemporal choice trials: baseline k elicitation trials
and intertemporal choices with prospective effort attributes.
Baseline Discount Parameter Elicitation Phase Participants made a
series of decisions regarding whether they would prefer to receive a smaller
amount of money immediately or a larger, variable amount of money after a
variable delay. For all trials, the two payment and delay options were presented
adjacent to each other on a computer monitor and subjects were instructed
to press a key associated with their preferred option. The immediate amount
was either $5 or $10, and the delayed option ranged from $5 to $120 at three
possible delays: 30, 60 and 90 days. Based on previous literature, it was
assumed that each participants pattern of discounting the value of the delayed
option followed a hyperbolic curve, with the steepness of the curve described
by the parameter k, with larger values of k resulting in greater discounting of
delayed rewards (Mazur, 1987). Given these assumptions, the subjective value
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where SV = the subjective value of the payment after accounting for its dis-
counted value, V = the numerical value of the payment, k = an individuals
discounting parameter, and D = the delay in days of the payment. Follow-
ing this form, we calculated the indifference point of each option, where the
subjective value of the delayed amount was equal to the actual value of the
immediate amount. We calculated the actual value of the delayed amount
(LL) given a delay and immediate amount by modulation of the hyperbolic
discount formula:
V = SV × (1 + kD)
where SV is equal to the immediate amount on any given trial. There were
48 randomized adaptive trials: 24 of two immediate values ($5 and $10), and
8 occurances of each delay (30, 60 or 90 days) for each. The initial estimate
of k was set to a value of (k = 0.013), an estimate of population average
intertemporal choice preferences from previous studies (Kable and Glimcher,
2007; Monterosso et al., 2007), to each of two staircases, one assigned to all im-
mediate $5 options and a second assigned to all immediate $10 options. We ad-
justed adaptive staircases during this task according to a maximum likelihood
estimation procedure with the QUEST toolbox in MATLAB (Watson and
Pelli, 1983). A combination of k -value estimate, delay, and immediate reward
amount were adjusted to determine the next delayed amount (LL) presented
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to each participant. The QUEST parameters were initialized as follows: start-
ing estimate (0.013), standard deviation (.02), probability of choosing delayed
(LL) option (0.5), Weibull function parameters (β = 5, δ = 0.01, γ = 0.01),
step size (0.001), and range of responses (1). If a participant chose the imme-
diate amount (SS), the indifference k -value on that trial was smaller than the
persons actual k -value and it was increased on the next trial. If a participant
chose the delayed amount (LL), the indifference k -value was decreased on the
next trial. Overall, this procedure was optimized to increase the likelihood
that the staircases would converge at a stable estimate of indifference (k by
the end of each 24 trial choice set. Finally, as a check of the adaptive stair-
case procedure, we also tested a rapid k estimation procedure from behavioral
economics (Kirby et al., 1999). We interspersed our staircase trials with 27
trials with prescribed fixed indifference k -values from this method.There were
nine k -values (0.005, 0.0075, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.075, 0.1) and two
randomized trial orders. Each k -value was tested once per delay and randomly
assigned to a starting value of $5 or $10.
Baseline Temporal Discounting Parameter Estimation: We estimated
the discount parameter k with three methods prior to the prospective effort
intertemporal choice phase. For each subject, two k estimates were calculated
as the average of 10 steps around the the convergence point of the $5 and
$10 SS staircases. Additionally, we calculated the k value from the fixed level
estimation trials (Kirby et al., 1999). The initial set of Kirby k value was the
geometric mean between each two consecutively tested k values, plus the lowest
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and highest k values. Each geometric mean was given a point if a participant
responded consistently in trials with that k value (consistently selected LL or
SS around the predicted indifference for that k level). The geometric mean
with the highest point total was considered a subject’s final Kirby k value. In
the case of ties, the geometric mean of the top two k values was used. Finally,
we calculated the arithmetic mean of the three methods ($5 staircase, $10
staircase and Kirby). This estimate was considered the calibrated baseline k
level for generation of choice sets in the prospective effort intertemporal choice
task. To test for consistency of parameter estimation, we also performed post-
hoc analysis of all trials in the baseline estimation choice set by the logistic
estimation method described in the next section.
Prospective Effort and Intertemporal Choice Task: Following the dis-
count parameter estimate phase, subjects entered the dual-task phase, prospec-
tive effort and intertemporal choice. Similar to the elicitation phase, subjects
were presented with a series of trials that offered a choice between receiving
a small reward (always $5) at the end of the experimental session or a larger
reward (varied) at some time in the future. In addition to the intertempo-
ral choice display, subjects were presented with one of five calibrated levels
of effort from the physical effort training session. This design presented sub-
jects a dual-task challenge: a choice between potential immediate and delayed
outcomes, associated with a separately resolved prospective effort challenge of
performing a level of physical effort five times in a row successfully at the end
of the task. Subjects were informed that performance on the effort challenge
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would result in a gain ($5) in addition to their initial endowment or loss ($3)
from it. To encourage subjects to consider the effort challenge consistently,
the prospective effort cue always proceeded the intertemporal choice display
by 500 milliseconds. Subjects were informed that the effort challenge associ-
ated with the intertemporal choice randomly selected trial at the end of the
experiment would be resolved as described below. Figure 4.1 illustrates the
task display during the baseline temperal discounting estimation and dual-task
intertemporal choice phases.
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Block 1 : Intertemporal Choice for Estimation of k
Which option do you prefer?
in 30 daystoday
$5 $14
Blocks 2-6 : Prospective Effort and Intertemporal Choice
Which option do you prefer?
in 30 daystoday
$5 $14
Which option do you prefer?
x 5
2500 ms display and response time








500 ms effort only display 2000 ms combined display and response time
Figure 4.1: Examples of stimulus displays during the two intertemporal choice
tasks. During block 1, the discount parameter elicitation phase, subjects were pre-
sented two options and indicated their preference with a key press. In blocks 2-6,
subjects were presented a series of individually calibrated intertemporal choices
paired with prospective effort challenges and again indicated their preference with
a key press.
The choice set included 210 trials, split into 5 blocks of 42 trials, trial
order optimized for event-related fMRI. As illustrated in 4.2, we calibrated the
range of potential LL values according to the estimated k -value obtained in
the baseline discount parameter estimation phase. In both samples, we tested
a choice set of 42 trials, with 6 possible delays (15, 30, 45, 60, 75 or 90 days)
and 7 possible k value multipliers. In each sample, we varied the amount of
LL reward on offer around individual subject’s estimated log-transformed k
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parameter according to a parametric constant (ε) from ± .1, .2 or .3 × k. For
each trial, the LL value presented was calculated according to the hyperbolic
discounting equation: LL = SS * ((1 + (kε)D) . For example, if a subject’s
choices in intertemporal choice block 1 (see figure 4.1) resulted in an estimated
k level of (0.03), LL values presented to the subject in the prospective effort
intertemporal choice blocks were calculated as LL = $5 × (1 + (±ε × 0.03)
× delay) . The only difference between samples in the task concerned the
rounding of LL values. In sample 1, we rounded LL values to the nearest
whole dollar. In order to increase the number of unique values in the choice


















































Example Calibrated LL Matrix (k = 0.03)







discount rate multiplier (ԑ)  
$LL = $5 · (1 + (( ԑ · k) · delay))
Figure 4.2: Each subject’s choice set was created according to their initial discount
parameter estimate whereby their discount parameter k was multiplied by their
discount rate constant ε . In the example shown, a subject with an initial k value
estimate of 0.03 was presented a range of LL values from $6 to $46 at each of five
levels of prospective effort in the dual-task. The range of discount rate multiplier
reflects the log-transformed multiplicative increase or decrease from baseline k. 1
indicates the initial calibrated baseline k value.
Prospective Effort Temporal Discounting Parameter Estimation We per-
formed post-hoc analyses to estimate the discount parameter k for each subject
within each prospective effort level choice set. We fit a discount function for
each 42 trial choice set with a two-parameter binary logit model. The choice
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probabilty function followed the form:
pLL =
1
1 + exp(β(SVLL − SVSS))
where pLL represents the probability of selecting the LL option as a function
of the difference between the subjective values of the SS and LL options. The
parameter β represents noise, inconsistency in choice preferences. As described
above, subjective values of the SS and LL options were calculated according
to equation:
SV = V/(1 + kD)
where V was $5, the constant value of the immediate option, and D was the
proposed delay in days. Finally, the discount parameter k was fit by maximum
likelihood estimation.
Confidence Ratings: After the mixed gambles phases and while still in
the scanner, subjects were asked to rate how confident they were that they
could perform each of nine levels of effort (10-90% of their MVC in 10% incre-
ments) five times in a row, as required to resolve gambles in the prospective
effort phase of the experiment successfully.
Prospective Effort and Intertemporal Choice Resolution: At the end
of the experiment, one trial from the prospective effort intertemporal choice
session was drawn at random. Subjects received their choice (either $5 or
a calibrated LL value) in the form of an electronic Amazon gift card. Gift
cards were issued for either immediate redemption or at the delay associated
with their choice. Separately, subjects were presented with the effort challenge
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associated with the effort level present in the randomly selected resolution trial.
The challenge comprised 5 sequential physical effort grip trials, as completed
in the training phase. If the subject successfully completed their challenge,
they were awarded $5 in cash in addition to their endowment. If they were
not successful, subjects paid a penalty of $3 in cash from their endowment.
Finally, subjects completed a questionnaire about their discounting preferences
and the behavioral paradigm.
4.4 Behavioral Results
4.4.1 Prospective Effort Task Validation:
As in our previous experiments, subjects’ performance and confidence
ratings reflected a graded cost imposed by our physical grip effort paradigm.
Results of the training and rating phases for each sample are summarized in
4.3 In both samples, subjects’ average performance during the effort training
phase reflected an effect of effort level: sample 1 (F (4, 110) = 15.65, p <
0.001), sample 2 (F (4, 130) = 16, p < 0.001). Subjects’ training behavior
was well described by a linear model whereby increased effort level reduced
training success: sample 1 (β = −0.13, t(113) = −7.84, p < 0.001). Effort
level explained a significant portion of variance in training success in sample
1 (R2 = 0.35, F = 61.6, p < 0.001). We found a similar relationship in sample
2 (β = −2.6, t(133) = −8.01, p < 0.001), whereby effort level explained a
significant portion of variance in training success (R2 = 0.32, F = 64.2, p <
0.001).
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Similarly, subjects’ post-task confidence ratings reflected an effect of
effort level upon expected success in the effort challenge resolution phase.
Average performance during the effort training phase reflected an effect of
effort level: sample 1 (F(8, 198) = 50.5, p < 0.001), sample 2: (F (8, 234) =
47.54, p < 0.001). We found that subjects’ post-task confidence ratings were
well described by a linear model whereby effort level predicted confidence in
sample 1: (β = −9.88, t(205) = −20.17, p < 0.001), whereby effort level ex-
plained a significant portion of variance in confidence ratings (R2 = 0.66, F =
407, p < 0.001), and sample 2: (β = −10.21, t(241) = −19.4, p < 0.001) with
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Sample 1 (23) Sample 1 (27)
Figure 4.3: Subjects’ average effort grip force performance (A,B) and post-task
confidence ratings (C,D) reflect modulation by effort level in each sample. Shaded
color bars around group averages indicate standard error of the mean.
4.4.2 Baseline Temporal Discount Parameter Estimation:
Temporal discount parameter k estimates obtained during the initial
intertemporal choice phase were tested for consistency between elicitation
method in each sample. Estimates of k obtained with each method were
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were highly correlated within each subject in both samples (Spearman′sρ >
0.8, p < 0.001), see figure 4.4 for illustration of cross-method estimate corre-
lation. Figure 4.5 illustrates consistent k estimates for two subjects, one with
more impatient preferences than the other.









































Discount Parameter Estimation Method
Figure 4.4: Estimates of all individual’s discount parameters by adaptive, logistic
and fixed methods were highly correlated. Bars indicate Spearman’s ρ correlation
between adaptive staircases at two immediate reward values (sc5 and sc10), fixed k
trials (Kirby, 1999) and post-hoc logistic maximum likelihood estimation methods.
All methods were highly correlated: Spearman′s ρ > 0.8, p < 0.001
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Figure 4.5: Estimates of individual’s discount parameter estimates by adaptive,
logistic and fixed methods. All methods were highly correlated. At left, a subject
with more impatient choice preferences, and at right, a subject with more patient
discount preferences
4.4.3 Dual-Task Intertemporal Choices
Subjects’ choices during the prospective effort intertemporal choice
phase did not exhibit a consistent pattern of modulation by prospective effort
cost. We separately analyzed average gamble acceptance rates for each sam-
ple’s data across effort conditions. In sample 1, average discount parameters
were not modulated by prospective effort level (F (4, 110) = 0.58, p = 0.69).
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The results of sample 1 are illustrated in figure 4.6.
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Mean Gamble Acceptance Rate by Effort Prospect
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Figure 4.6: Heatmaps illustrate average gamble acceptance rates and reaction times
across each level of prospective effort. (top) Each heatmap represents the average
acceptance rate for each offer, a combination of delay, discount rate multiplier and
baseline k level. (bottom) Each heatmap illustrates the median-mean reaction time
for each offer. Overall, average gamble behavior and reaction time were not modu-
lated by prospective effort attributes in a dual-task.
Similarly, we did not find a consistent pattern of discount parame-
ter modulation by effort prospect in our second sample. The was no ef-
fect of prospective effort level upon average discount parameter estimate:
(F (4, 140) = 0.55, p = 0.7). A linear function did not describe estimated k
parameters by effort level (β = −0.61, t(143) = −0.56, p = 0.57). The results
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Figure 4.7: Heatmaps illustrate average gamble acceptance rates and reaction times
across each level of prospective effort. (top) Each heatmap represents the average
acceptance rate for each offer, a combination of delay, discount rate multiplier and
baseline k level. (bottom) Each heatmap illustrates the median-mean reaction time
for each offer. Overall, average gamble behavior and reaction time were not modu-
lated by prospective effort attributes in a dual-task.
Finally, all subjects completed a survey after the experimental session.
The results of the survey are depicted in table 4.1 below. On average, subjects
indicated that they did not strongly consider the potential effort prospect
during dual-task intertemporal choices.
Post-Task Survey Question (1-7) Mean Response
How motivated were you during the task? Did you care about your selections? 4.68
1 = did not care much, 7 = cared a lot
How interested were you in receiving money today, compared to in the future? 4.26
1 = did not care much, 7 = cared a lot
Did you believe that we would actually issue you a gift card with the proper amount in the future? 5.85
1 = did not believe, 7 = strongly believed
How much did you think about the potential effort when making your choices? 2.86
1 = not at all, 7 = a lot
Table 4.1: Temporal Discounting Task Survey Results
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4.5 Discussion
There exists considerable evidence that choice behavior in many species
reflects discounting of delayed rewards over immediate ones. Studies of the
neural basis of delay-based valuation suggest that a core network of prefrontal
regions calculate the value of delayed options as a function of their distance in
time. Furthermore, several studies suggest at least partial dissociation between
neural correlates of delay-based valuation and other common costs (Walton
et al., 2006; Prevost et al., 2010). Despite substantial progress, the influence
of effort costs upon intertemporal choice behavior remains largely unexam-
ined outside of the literature on animal foraging behavior. We hypothesized
that pairing an effort prospect with an intertemporal choice would modu-
late subjects’ preferences for immediate or delayed rewards. We adapted the
prospective effort paradigm in a dual-task that asked subjects to reflect upon
intertemporal choices that were associated with a prospective effort cost when
resolved. Contrary to our study of prospective effort under risk, we did not
observe a consistent pattern of choice behavior modulation as prospective ef-
fort level increased. Nevertheless, these experiments offer useful lessons for the
integration effort-based decision making and intertemporal choice literature.
Our choice sets were individually calibrated according to a baseline tempo-
ral discounting estimate, designed to present subjects intertemporal choices
around their expected indifference points between delayed immediate rewards.
However, our results suggest that a large, fixed choice set may improve consis-
tency of discount parameter estimates. For example, subjects with very small
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estimates of baseline discounting (e.g. k < 0.005) were by design presented
with a narrow range of unique LL values, the maximum of which might be less
than twice the SS value. Consequently, these subjects exhibited substantial
inconsistency in their choice behavior that made accurate estimation of their
k parameter impossible. Overall, subsequent studies with small choice sets
should offer fewer levels of prospective effort and/or a wider range of potential
delays and discount factors. In addition to a wider choice set and improved
estimation methods, modification of the prospective effort paradigm is needed
as well. A post-task survey (see table 4.1 indicated that on average, subjects
did not consider strongly the level of prospective effort upon their choices.
Thus, the present results likely reflect well-described insensitivity to prospec-
tive costs among subjects ’playing for peanuts’. Given the relatively small
loss incurred by the failure to perform prospective effort, subjects were likely
motivated to consider our task in an delay-based frame alone. Modification of
the paradigm to include large potential losses for failure to succeed in effort
trials or other aversive contingencies may elicit different results. With these
comments in mind, the prospective effort approach may yet yield new evidence
for interaction or dissociation of effort and delay costs in decision making pro-
cesses. In the final chapter, I will discuss broader implications of this study for
future attempts to disentangle behavioral and neural correlates of valuation





We often face decisions of whether to act, choices between alternatives
that vary in inherent effort costs. When presented with such choices, adaptive
behavior requires a valuation process that weighs expected costs and rewards
and integrates them among alternatives to guide choice. The integration of
psychological and economic theory with neural data has begun to reveal the
behavioral and neural correlates of specific cost valuation processes of com-
mon choices. Compared to canonical economic costs such as risk and delay,
accounts of effort-based valuation lack consensus. This thesis considered a
novel prospective effort paradigm designed to separate effort-based valuation
from risk and delay costs and link patterns of effort-based choice behavior and
neural activity. In this final chapter, I discuss the contributions of the work
presented in this thesis in the context of previous neuroeconomic research. I
discuss the theoretical foundation of effort-based valuation research and sum-
marize our findings in comparison to limited existing accounts of effort-based
valuation in humans. Finally, I comment upon outstanding challenges related
to the study of effort and theoretical accounts of cognition likely to inform the
next generation of effort-based valuation research.
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5.2 Effort-Based Valuation and the Law of Least Work
Decades of research demonstrate that normative choice behavior re-
flects a cost-benefit analysis whereby cost expectations weigh upon potential
rewards. Like rewards, costs may take many forms, from pain, delay, and
monetary loss to social exclusion. A construct of intrinsic action cost, ef-
fort describes the energetic resources required to pursue an alternative. While
choice behavior research historically focused on reward centric accounts (value-
maximization), century old observations and descriptions of effort-based choice
support attention to avoidance of energy expenditure (effort-minimization).
The basic principle of this framework, described by (Hull, 1943) as the law
of least effort, remains relevant today. It states that all else being equal, a
decision maker will select the course of action associated with the least energy
expenditure. This effort-aversion principle follows similar accounts in behav-
ioral economics that link effort to disutility, and accounts of foraging behavior
in diverse species (Charnov, 1976).
5.3 Neuroimaging of Effort: Advances and Caveats
As discussed in Chapter 1, the emergence of neuroeconomics has in-
spired diverse attempts to link neural data to behavioral patterns described
by psychological and economic theories. The contribution of contemporary
neuroimaging studies of effort-based choice to neuroeconomics centers largely
upon the extension of two sets of findings from the animal literature in hu-
man subjects. In the first group, several studies supported a series seminal
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experiments by Salamone et al. (2012, 2007) that linked dopamine and the ven-
tral striatum, a region related to a reinforcement learning model of motivated
behavior, to invigoration of effort-based behavior and cost-benefit inferences
(Croxson et al., 2009; Kurniawan et al., 2010). In the second group, researchers
adapted paradigms from animal literature (Rudebeck et al., 2006) to test for
the separation of neural systems for effort and delay based choices, particu-
larly the role of the anterior cingulate cortex in effort-based choices (Prevost
et al., 2010). Together, these neuroimaging studies support the basic notion of
effort as a cost, revealed in patterns of neural activity related to value present
in striatum. Secondly, a subset of these studies reinforce the localization of
effort-based valuation inferences to the ACC and frontopolar cortex, regions
outside the core fronto-striatal valuation network (Prevost et al., 2010; Kur-
niawan et al., 2013; Burke et al., 2013). While broadly consistent previous
animal studies, contemporary neuroimaging studies of effort-based valuation
present several important caveats to address. Foremost, the varied task de-
signs employed across studies consistently fail to address the critical confound
of time. In both the animal and human tasks, non-choice or forced-choice
scenarios fail to address confound of greater delay with greater effort exertion,
as well as potential activity related to expected exertion or outcomes. Thus,
the patterns of neural activity reported in these studies cannot reflect purely
effort-based inferences. Notably, two recent neuroimaging studies that offered
physical (Kurniawan et al., 2013) or cognitive (Schouppe et al., 2014) effort-
based choices did not find significant evidence for ACC modulation by effort
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cost. Together with our own study, these results suggest that task demands
in effort-based choice may differ substantially from those related to passive
reception of cost-benefit stimuli or forced choice contexts, as shown in dis-
parate patterns of neural activity at choice. Regardless, as discussed below,
all studies to date presented highly constrained, temporally separated events
that differ substantially from naturalistic choices.
5.4 Summary of Findings in Context
In our first set of studies, we adapted a mixed gamble decision mak-
ing task from behavioral economics to assess the influence of prospective effort
upon risk preference. In multiple behavioral studies, we found reduced willing-
ness to take risks associated with increased prospective effort challenges (see
Chapter 2). We developed this task to address a key confound in the effort-
based decision making literature, a failure to separate choices about effort
from immediate effort production or outcome anticipation. Our behavioral
studies found that individually calibrated prospective effort conditions im-
posed a graded cost upon decision makers. A subsequent neuroimaging study
examined neural activity during prospective effort mixed gamble choices. We
found that in the absence of immediate effort production, a network of brain
regions responded to prospective effort costs (see Chapter 3). These regions
included those previously related to anticipation of aversive outcomes, and ef-
fort production, such as insular cortex and motor cortex (Meyniel et al., 2013;
Kurniawan et al., 2013). Notably, we found novel evidence for sensitivity to
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prospective effort in a large region of interest that included dorsal premotor
cortex. Contrary to previous effort-related animal and human neuroimaging
studies, analyses performed whole-brain level and within several small volume
regions of interest did not find sensitivity to effort in the anterior cingulate
cortex. Similarly, we did not observe sensitivity to effort cost within the stria-
tum, a part of the core valuation network implicated as the site of integration
of outcome value and effort cost (Kurniawan et al., 2010; Schouppe et al.,
2014) at choice. While our results do not dissociate specific structures from
effort-based valuation, they follow recent neurophysiological findings in animal
models that suggest the contribution of ACC may reflect nuanced, context
specific demands (Pasquereau and Turner, 2013; Euston, 2014). For exam-
ple, the findings of Euston (2014) suggest that ACC does not contribute to
effort-based action selection, but provides critical input to maintain effortful
behavior in spite of the cost of exertion. Similarly, recent accounts put into
question the direct link of dopamine-related activity within striatum to effort
and reward expectations. Specifically, a critical review of neuroeconomic lit-
erature sutggests that activation of striatum may reflect influences of salience
in task designs, rather than expected cost-benefit or preferences (Salamone
and Correa, 2012). Finally, we found novel evidence for neural correlates of
hedonic value discounted by prospective effort cost. Many studies implicate
vmPFC activity at choice as a neural correlate of abstract subjective value
across many decision making contexts (Sescousse et al., 2013). We found that
activity within this region reflected sensitivity to potential gains and costs as
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they varied across trials in our task. Our finding adds to the growing consen-
sus that vmPFC activity at choice reflects an estimate of the cost and benefit
of the chosen option, necessary for learning contingencies of actions and out-
comes. In a separate analysis, we found that neural activity within a similar
network of regions was sensitive to subjective value predicted by a hyperbolic
effort-discounting model. Compared to a similar model of subjective value
under risk prospects, this analysis again revealed the contribution of dorsal
premotor areas in effort based inference. In total, our experiments regarding
decision making under risk and prospective effort presented a new behavioral
approach for testing hypotheses related effort-based valuation in healthy and
abnormal populations and provided novel evidence of distinct neural activity
patterns related to effort-based valuation. Subsequent studies described in
Chapter4 attempted to apply the prospective effort paradigm to valuation of
intertemporal choices. In a dual-task paradigm, we did not find modulation of
individual preferences when paired with prospective effort challenges. Despite
individual calibration of expected sensitivity to delay, this paradigm did not
induce consistent patterns of increased or decreased preferences for immediate
over delayed rewards. A post-task assessment of subjects’ behavior and sur-
vey responses suggested that prospective effort attributes were not salient in
subjects’ dual-task choices. Nevertheless, these studies extended our original
behavioral findings and contributed to further calibration and confirmation
of prospective training paradigm. We found that additional calibration tri-
als resulted in a stronger linear relationship between prospective effort level,
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training performance and post-task confidence. Together, the findings of our
intertemporal choice and risk studies presented and validated a rapid, simple
paradigm for imposition of effort cost in neuroeconomic study and suggested
new directions for task design.
5.5 Outstanding Issues and Future Directions
The integration of behavioral and biological accounts of decision making
processes has begun to substantially contribute to the understanding of effort-
based choice behavior. As a nascent discipline, there remain several open
questions likely to guide future endeavors to link effort motivated behavior to
neural activity.
5.5.1 Formal Models of Effort-Based Valuation
The success of neuroeconomic accounts of valuation under delay and
risk derives in large part from their ability to test specific predictions of behav-
ioral models of valuation, for example the seminal studies of Tom et al. (2007);
Kable and Glimcher (2007) described in Chapter 1. Similarly, a unified ac-
count of effort-based valuation requires the examination of model predictions
and neural activity during choice. To date, accounts of effort-based decision
making rely upon simple additive models of cost or borrow the hyperbolic dis-
counting model from intertemporal choice studies (Prevost et al., 2010; Talmi
and Pine, 2012). The account of the integration of effort and outcomes in
our experiments presented thus far remains a largely informal description of
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effort-based valuation. The final account of the data presented in this thesis
must formally test the predictions of valuation under multiple existing models
and novel models derived from paradigm behavior, including linear, hyperbolic
and parabolic effort discount functions (Bonnelle et al., 2014). Additionally,
effort integration models should incorporate information related to individ-
ual subject’s effort performance and confidence ratings to identify patterns of
behavior and neural activity related to differences in effort preferences.
5.5.2 Naturalistic Task Design
We know that the brain evolved. This fact not only motivates de-
scriptions of mechanisms of effort-based choice, but also constrains them with
respect to the choices our ancestors faced. Critically, ethologically relevant
choices incur multiple canonical economic costs simultaneously. A model of si-
multaneous valuation of risk, delay and effort that identifies neural correlates of
each process and subjective value remains a considerable challenge. One poten-
tial approach illustrated in figure 5.1 presents subjects with a choice between
costs prior to evaluation of risk preferences. However, such a constrained task
differs substantially from naturalistic behavior. Similarly, while our research
and much of the field derives from the assumption of anatomically modular,
sequential stages of neural processing, attention must be paid to more natu-
ralistic choice proposals. For example, the Affordance Competition Hypothesis
posits that evolutionary pressure cannot result in a brain optimally designed to
evaluate discrete, serially presented trials that comprise typical neuroeconomic
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studies (Cisek, 2012). Instead, the brain should prepare responses to expected
affordances, potential actions associated with outcomes, and continuously up-
date their representation with relevant cost-benefit information. The finding
of neural activity related to outcome or subjective value model predictions
in our neuroimaging study may reflect such neural processes. While directly
testing the predictions of this model with neuroimaging present considerable
design challenges, the advance of rapid acquisition technology and whole-brain
pattern analysis techniques may provide the framework to link neural activity
to affordance competition in more naturalistic effort-based choices.
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Choice
Figure 5.1: The integration of multiple cost attributes into a single ecologically valid
task remains a considerable challenge for neuroeconomic research. One approach
might ask subjects to reflect upon prospective or subsequent cost type (top), prior
to a choice among risk prospects (bottom).
5.5.3 Limitations of Physical Effort Paradigms
In the work presented in this thesis, I argued that a prospective effort
paradigm offers significant advantages over previous effort-based paradigms.
However, modulation of effort cost by grip force production represents a spe-
cific embodied effort cost. Integration of our prospective effort account with
the literature on cognitive effort, fatigue and persistence is needed to produce
a complete normative account of effort cost. Unlike discrete grip force produc-
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tion, cognitive effort incurs highly variable temporal costs, similar to repetitive
physical responding. Both forms of effort require self-control to balance tem-
porally limited motivational demands, a concept explored in recent reviews of
cognitive effort (Kurzban et al., 2013) and cingulate cortex function (Shen-
hav et al., 2014) that describe their relation to motivational impairments that
characterize many psychological disorders.
5.5.4 Effort Justification or Effort-Based Enhancement of Value?
The development and validation of the prospective effort paradigm pre-
sented in this thesis was predicated on the assumption that physical effort
reflects a cost that decreases subjective value. While there exists considerable
evidence to support effort-discounting, a unified, normative account of effort-
based valuation must address paradoxical reports of value boosted by effort.
For example, limited reports suggest that animals exhibit enhanced preferences
for cues associated with more effortful actions (Johnson and Gallagher, 2011;
Klein et al., 2005). In daily life, humans and animals readily engage and persist
in effortful tasks. Theoretical and experimental accounts suggest the involve-
ment of brainstem domapinergic and noradrenergic systems in the invigoration
and maintenance of effortful behaviors (Kurzban et al., 2013; Shenhav et al.,
2014; Malecek and Poldrack, 2013), and must be incorporated into the final
account of effort. Similarly, the concepts of cognitive dissonance and effort-
justification from behavioral psychology and attempts to further demonstrate
or refute effort-based boosting of value prove present key challenges for the uni-
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fication of this literature. For example, future studies should examine the role
of effort production upon modulation of risk taking or impulsivity, with partic-
ular emphasis upon the timing of action and outcome. Phasic dopamine release
in striatum during effortful action may enhance the value of cues present dur-
ing exertion, which may result in bias for those cues in subsequent free choice
contexts. Similarly, neurophysiological studies have found neurons within cin-
gulate cortex, amygdala and striatum that respond to modulation of effort and
risk. Together, these results suggest there remains considerable opportunity
to redefine key concepts and fundamental understanding of domain motivated
behavior with new descriptive models and neural data.
5.6 Conclusion
5.6.1 Towards a Unified Account of Choice Behavior
Effort-based decision making comprises a fundamental aspect of animal
behavior. The experiments presented in this thesis detailed aspects of how
effort-based valuation affects choice behavior and neural activity. I demon-
strated that the prospective effort paradigm improves upon previous attempts
to test effort-based valuation and suggest the recruitment of distinct neural
regions for effort-based valuation separated from production or anticipation of
outcomes. I presented the results of our experiments in the context of pre-
vious human and animal studies of value-based decision making, and suggest
new directions towards a unified account of choice behavior. Incorporation of
ethologically valid tasks across mutliple levels of analysis to test model-driven
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predictions of effort’s influence upon behavior and neural activity offers great
promise to inform models of healthy cognition. Given the great societal cost of
common impairments in motivated behavior, such models offer great promise
to inform the next generation of behavioral and neurological treatments.
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